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A Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There be Peaceful
Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State?
H. Wayne House*
"[I]n America we don't have Christian law, Jewish law, Moslem law.
We only have law-law." 1
Nicholas von Hoffman, syndicated columnist

"The highest glory of the American Revolution was this; it connected
in one indissoluble bond the principles of civil government with the principles of Christianity."2
John Quincy Adams, sixth President of the United States

* Copyright © 1999 by H. Wayne House, Professor of Law (Trinity Law School) and
Professor of Theology and Culture (Trinity Graduate School) at Trinity International University. J.D.,
O.W. Coburn School of Law; Th.D., Concordia Seminary, St. Louis; M.Div., Th.M., Western
Seminary; M.A., Abilene Christian University; B.A., Hardin-Simmons University. I wish to express
appreciation to Michael J. Holmes, Jon Paine and Robert Semain for their help in collecting materials
and checking citations. I also would like to thank James Eriksen, Esq. for reading the article and
offering suggestions.
I. Nicholas von Hoffman, "We Don't Have Christian Law or Jewish Law; Only Law-Law,"
(column licensed with King Features, source on file with the author). With these words, syndicated
columnist Nicholas von Hoffman threw down a gauntlet against any who would presume that the
law might be viewed from another perspective than a neutral framework. This statement was in
response to rumors that Oral Roberts University allegedly had a policy against admitting nonChristian students into their law program and proclaiming that they were attempting in their law
school to teach a Christian perspective on the law. Von Hoffman continues in his article,
No Jews or agnostics need apply. Catholics, also, probably aren't welcome, although the
news reports don't make that completely clear .
You must also submit letters of
recommendation from your local fundamentalist ayatollah or pastor, such letters to include
a detailed description of how well you practice your devoirs, how fervent your prayers
and how orthodox your thought and theology.
/d.
Von Hoffman makes these acerbic comments without knowing, apparently that the law school had
a policy of admitting Christians of all faiths as well as Jewish students who should apply and qualify
under standard law school standards. I have personally known graduates from the law school at ORU
who were Roman Catholics. As well, I have a letter from the admissions office indicating that they
not only admit Christians of various persuasions but also have students representing Judaism, Islam,
and Tibetan Buddhism, among others.
2. JOHN WINGATE THORNTON, THE PULPIT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION XXIX (1860;
1970), quoted in WILLIAM J. FEDERER, AMERICA'S GOD AND COUNTRY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
QUOTATIONS 18 (1996).
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An uneasy peace exists between the kingdom of God and the kingdom
of the world 3 in contemporary America. At an earlier time in American
history it seemed that Christian religious sects had found the promised
land similar to what the Israelites had done more than three thousand years
earlier. 4 Arriving from European persecution, largely religious
persecution, 5 these Christian immigrants (Puritans and Separatists or
Pilgrims alike) were to be "a City upon a hill" 6 and the new Israel. 7
The words of John Quincy Adams at the fiftieth anniversary of the
inauguration of George Washington as the president of the United Sates,
reflects this type of perspective shared by Americans at the time:

Fellow-citizens, the ark of your covenant is the Declaration
of Independence. Your Mount Ebal, is the confederacy of
separate state sovereignties, and your Mount Gerizim is the
Constitution of the United States. In that scene of tremendous
and awful solemnity, narrated in the Holy Scriptures, there is
not a curse pronounced against the people, upon Mount Ebal,
not a blessing promised them upon Mount Gerizim, which your
posterity may not suffer or enjoy, from your and their

3. The two kingdoms perspective was a key ingredient of the Reformation (cf Martin
Luther's kingdom of the left, the state, and the kingdom of the right, the church). See in{ra text
accompanying notes 166-67.
4. I speak of the Hebrews' Exodus from Egypt, circa 1445 B.C., although many scholars
place the date at 1290 B.C. or later.
5. See the discussion in BENJAMIN HART, FAITH AND FREEDOM: THE CHRISTIAN ROOTS OF
AMERICAN LIBERTY 67-75 (1988).
6. The phrase "a City upon a hill" is taken from Matthew 5:14, where Jesus speaks of a
"city on a hill" and is used by Puritan John Winthrop, the founder and first governor of the
Massachusetts Bay Colony. The fuller statement in his famous work, A Model of Christian Charity,
penned on June 11, 1630, says,
For we must Consider that we shall be as a City upon a Hill, the eyes of all people are
upon us; so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken
and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be made a story and
a by-word through the world.
ADAM WINTHROP, "A Model of Christian Charity," 2 WINTHROP PAPERS 1623-1630 (1931) at 292295, (quoted in FEDERER, supra note 2, at 700).
See the discussion on John Winthrop by HART, supra note 5, at 83-96. See also the study on the
contribution of early Puritans to American constitutionalism, John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City
on a Hill: The Early Puritan Contribution to American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 41-64
(1990).
7. The terminology of the Pilgrims often coincided with that found in the Bible. Hart
remarks
They were there on a mission-on God's errand into the wilderness. They were the new
children of Israel, spiritual descendants of Abraham, sent by the winds of Providence into
a desolate wasteland, just as Moses and the Jews were sent for 40 years into the desert.
But the faith of Brewster, Carver, Bradford, and their Pilgrim brethren, that indeed their
ordeal would serve a purpose, was very definitely the source of their power to begin the
awesome task of building the United States of America - a fact that should cause even
the atheist to marvel.
HART supra note 5, at 78-79.
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adherence to, or departure from, the principles of the
Declaration of Independence, practically interwoven into the
Constitution of the United States. Lay up these principles,
then, in your hearts, and in your souls - bind them for signs
upon your hands, that they may be frontlets between your eyes
- teach them to your children, speaking of them when sitting
in your houses, when walking by the way, when lying down
and when rising up - write them upon the doorplates of your
houses, and upon your gates - cling to them as to the issues of
life - adhere to them as to the cords of your eternal salvation.
So may your children's children at the next return of this day
of jubilee, after a full century of experience under your
national Constitution, celebrate it again in the full enjoyment
of all the blessings recognized by you in the commemoration of
this day, and of all the blessings promised to the children of
Israel upon Mount Gerizim, as the reward of your obedience to
the law of God. 8
Much has happened in approximately three hundred and fifty years. 9
What was largely a white European and religiously Protestant populace
has become ethnically and religiously diverse. 10 This state of affairs has
become obvious only in this century, since a series of decisions were
issued by the Supreme Court which disestablished the Christian religion
from places of influence in the public sphere which it had held for more
than one hundred and fifty years of America's history as a republic.
Not only does the past serve as an indication of religion's influence on
America, but the continued embracing of religion by Americans in the
contemporary Western world is astounding. 11 Moreover, our public life of

8. "The Jubilee of the Constitution," A discourse delivered at the request of the New York
Historical Society in the City of New York, on Tuesday, the 30th of April, 1839, being the fiftieth
anniversary of the Inauguration of George Washington as the President of the United States, on
Thursday, the 30th of April, 1789; by John Quincy Adams (entered according to the Act of
Congress, in the year 1839, by Joseph Blunt, for the New York Historical Society, in the District
Court of the Southern District of New York, at 56).
9. This dating refers to the founding of Jamestown in 1609.
10. It is estimated that America has more than 1200 different religious groups. See Note, II.
The Complex Interaction between Religion and Government, 100 HARV. L.REV. 1612 (1987). The
state of religious pluralism in America has been described as "[f]ar from being in a position to
squelch pluralism, religion today is itself a riot of pluralism." Maimon Schwarzschild, Religion and
Public Debate in a Liberal Society: Always Oil and Water or Sometimes More Like Rum and CocaCola?, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 903, 913 (1993).
11. Polls reveal that ninety-five percent of Americans believe in God and seventy percent are
members of a church or synagogue. Michael J. Perry, Religion, Politics, and the Constitution, 7 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 407 (1996); Maddigan reveals other statistics even more illustrative:
[T]he controversy surrounding Establishment Clause issues is likely to continue because
religion plays an increasingly important, though paradoxical role in American public life.
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what may be called civil religion 12 reveals an amazing pervasiveness of
religious faith in the public sphere, from common parlance to the chambers
of the Supreme Court. Religion is in the life of the people in cliches (thank
God its Friday), holidays (Christmas, Easter, even Halloween [hallowed
eve]), cities in which they live (St. Paul, Corpus Christi), attendance at
religious worship 13 and reporting of the polls! 4 music and art (Christmas
carols in shopping centers, Amazing Grace a top tune on secular stations,
and religious art in art galleries, including the National Art Gallery in
Washington, D.C.), to mention widely known examples.
The civil religion of America is also obvious in the statements and
proclamations of its leaders (e.g. presidents and candidates saying God
bless America at conventions and television addresses, prayer breakfast
addresses by government leaders); the appearance of "In God We Trust"
on its coinage; our pledge of allegiance including "one nation under God;"
observance of "national days of prayer;" the use of the Bible for
administering oaths to federal and state officials as well as to witnesses in
court; Thanksgiving as a national holiday; religious statements etched in
stone on government buildings; recognition of Sunday in the Constitution
as a day in which bills do not need to be signed; the ways in which prayer
is offered in the federal and state legislative chambers and in the courts of
the land; acknowledgment of God in state preambles; and the presence of
the Decalogue behind the Justices of the Supreme Court. 15
Considering the pervasiveness of religion, especially the Christian
religion, on so many facets of the private sector and the governmental
sector too, one would think that religion and the state were on friendly

Statistics show that Americans are among the most religious people in the world. More
than 94% of Americans believe in God or a universal spirit, 71% believe in heaven, and
53% believe in hell. More than 40% of Americans attend church or synagogue weekly.
with college graduate more likely to go than high school dropouts. Funhemwre, 78% of
Americans pray at least once a week and 57% pray at least once a day. In fact,
Americans repol1edly invoke the deity more frequently than they go to work or have sex.
See Michael M. Maddigan, The Establishment Clause. Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81
CALIF. L. REV. 293, 294-295 ( 1993).
12. Maddigan speaks favorably of the value of civil religion to law and morals. Maddigan.
supra note II, at 294-348. Richards, on the other hand. believes civil religion is opposed to the
constitutional government given by the Framers. See David A. J. Richards, Civil Religion and
Constitutional Legitimacy, 29 WM. & MARY L.REV. 177 (1987).
13. See Perry, supra note 11, at 407.
14. !d.
15. The existence of the Ten Commandments in the Supreme Cou11 chambers is interesting
in view of the decision of the Coul1 regarding the posting of these commandments in the public
school classrooms: "The framers and ratifiers could not conceivably have anticipated that the
Supreme Coul1, sitting in a courtroom with a painting of Moses and the Ten Commandments, would
hold it an unconstitutional establishment of religion for a high school to have a copy of the Ten
Commandments on a wall." ROBERT H. 80RK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 289-90 (1996) (referring to the coul1s ruling in Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980)).
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terms, certainly not married but at least dating. Such is very often not the
case. For example, underlying von Hoffman's sardonic comments at the
head of the article seems to be the assumption shared by many in the legal
community that there is a safe zone or no-man's land in the law so that a
person's own world view or value system is not present when dealing with
the law. 16 They teach this assumption to the uninitiated in the general
public with slogans like "wall of separation of church and state," 17 or the

16. A good example of imposing one's own value system is illustrated in statements I have
made elsewhere:
A good example of this is found in Justice Brennan's well known perspective on the
death penalty and the Eighth Amendment. He considers capital punishment to be in
violation of the Eighth Amendment against Cruel and Unusual Punishment. This very
statement portends that he can understand the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. But
he contends that modem society has raised itself above the eighteenth century's archaic
morality which advocated the death penalty. This position, however, is wrought with
inconsistency since the Eighth Amendment is in tandem with the provisions for capital
crimes. Moreover, the morality of the eighteenth century in this area has not significantly
fluctuated to the present day. Consistently, the public has favored capital punishment by
large margins.
So how does Brennan support this thesis? He substitutes his wisdom for that of the
Framers who included capital punishment, those Justices who have not sequaciously
followed him, and the public, he admits, who in general disagree with him. This
assuredly is problematic for a Justice who has sworn to uphold and defend the
Constitution and is required to serve under good behavior.
H. WAYNE HOUSE, Introduction to RESTORING THE CONSTITUTION: Is JUDICIAL ACTIVISM DESTROYING
THE CONSTITUTION? 5 (H. Wayne House ed., 1987).
17. Even before Jefferson's phrase "wall of separation between Church and State" written to
the Danbury Baptists (see Daniel S. Dreisbach, "Sowing Useful Truths and Principles": The
Danbury Baptists, Thomas Jefferson, and the "Wall of Separation," 39 J. CHURCH AND STATE 455
( 1997) for a thorough look at the Danbury letter and Jefferson's views of church and state), appeared
in Everson (see infra text accompanying notes 286-90, especially comment by Levy note 286), its
first use in a Supreme Court opinion, to my knowledge, was in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 164, where the Court was reviewing the history of the adoption of the Bill of Rights,
particularly the First Amendment:
Mr. Jefferson afterwards, in reply to an address to him by a committee of the Danbury
Baptist Association . . . took occasion to say: Believing with you that religion is a matter
which lies solely between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his
faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and
not opinions, - I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of
separation between church and State.
Jefferson's mention of the "whole American people" indicates that his concern was with the federal
legislature, the only body he viewed as capable constitutionally of reaching into religion. His acts as
president would belie a ftnn wall when sectarian means achieved secular ends (see ROBERT L. CORD,
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 115-116 (1982) or
when individual states acted in the area of religion (see Dreisbach, supra at 471-481). Some believe
that Jefferson may have developed his metaphor "wall of separation between church and state" from
Rhode Island Baptist leader Roger Williams who had earlier said:
when they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of separation between the garden of
the church and the wilderness of the world, God hath ever broken down the wall itself,
removed the candlestick, and made His garden a wilderness, as at this day. And that
therefore if He will eer please to restored His garden and paradise again, it must of
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dogma that law operates in a religionless vacuum. Such a perspective
would be shared by few in the first two centuries of the Republic 18 and
proves not to be the reality, in my view, that one encounters in the
academy, the courts, or the marketplace today. 19 The purpose of this article
is to examine the present state of affairs between religion and the state, to
investigate the historic relationship between church and state, and to
evaluate the current status of establishment clause jurisprudence in light of
the present and historic perspectives, and last to offer a modest suggestion
as to how these questions can be better approached to minimize church
and state tension in America.
The organization of the article is found in three parts. Part I presents
how Christianity is often treated in the legal sphere in society so that
religious values are pushed from the public sphere to the private realm.
Part II sets forth evidence that such has not always been the case. In fact,
Christian perspectives dominated the moral and legal thought of the West
and heavily influenced the development of law in Western Europe and
England, as well as the founding and development of American
government and law. Part III seeks to demonstrate that the failure of the
Supreme Court to articulate a consistent and historically informed meaning
of religion has produced contradictory and confusing Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. This section also examines ways in which the Court has
stipulated and experimented with various legal theories and how legal
writers have sought to provide guidance to the Court in this area.

I. THE CONTEMPORARY ASSAULT ON CHRISTIAN VALUES IN SECULAR
SOCIETY

A.

The Current State of Law and Religion in American Law

The attempt of religious citizens, particularly the majority religion,
Christianity, to make an impact on the political and legal process has fallen
on hard times in recent years under a theory that the law should reflect no
religious view since this would violate the Establishment Clause. 20 The
fact that this might be an expression of the free exercise of religion 21

necessity be walled in peculiarly unto Himself from the world.
(quoted in JOHN EIDSMOE, THE CHRISTIAN LEGAL ADVISOR 143 (1984)).
To Williams, the purpose of the wall was to protect the church from the government, not vice
versa. /d. Dreisbach, however, provides evidence for a common source to Jefferson and Williams
in the Scotsman James Burgh. See Dreisbach, supra at 486-490.
18. See infra text accompanying note 156.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 178-463.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 253-368.
21. "Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise thereof [religion]." U.S.
CONST. amend I.
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carries little weight, for in the jurisprudence of the Court, the
Establishment Clause, which is absolute, always trumps the free exercise
clause which is more narrow as to conduct, though not belief.Z2
The desire to have one's deepest convictions have an impact in the
culture or marketplace of ideas receives a judicial rebuff in a way that
would have been unheard of in former days for two reasons. First, the
court has come to believe that religious views, apart from clearly stated
secular purposes, are violative of the Establishment Clause. 23 Second, the
arm of the federal government, against which the First Amendment is
addressed, was once short. The states, before the incorporation doctrine, 24

22. The meaning of "religion" in the Establishment Clause is viewed as absolute by the
courts, whereas "religion" in free exercise is limited, with the right to believe being absolute but the
right to practice one's belief being necessarily limited. The Court enunciated this free exercise beliefaction dichotomy in Cantwell, where Justice Roberts explained that
the amendment raises two concepts - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first
is absolute, but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject
to regulation for the protection of society. The freedom to act must have appropriate
definition to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe
the protected freedom.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
23. This perspective gave rise to the famous "secular purpose" doctrine developed in Lemon.
See infra at text accompanying notes 318-30. Allen affirmed the appeals court of New York (20
N.Y.2d 109, 117 (1967)) which pennitted distribution of materials to citizens without regards to
religious affiliation:
The Court of Appeals said that the law's purpose was to benefit all school children,
regardless of the type of school they attended, and that only textbooks approved by public
school authorities could be loaned. It therefore considered "completely neutral with respect
to religion, merely making available secular textbooks at the request of the individual
student and asking no question about what school he attends."
Board of Education of Central School District No. I v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 (1968).
Lemon sought to limit the practice advocated in Allen but found itself enmeshed in its own web
of entangling itself in religion:
The Court held that before the state could aid the secular component of sectarian
education, the state must ensure that public aid would not breach the imaginary wall
erected between the secular and religious components. In order to satisfy this command,
the state was required to employ vigilant and comprehensive surveillance to ensure that
no aid be used for the inculcation of religion. The states had undertaken to do so in this
case by conditioning aid on the schools' acquiescence to state audit to ensure compliance
with grant restrictions. The Court concluded, however, that such surveillance necessarily
entailed excessive government interference in the affairs of religious schools and therefore
resulted in an unconstitutional entanglement between government and religion. Justice
Rehnquist subsequently described this situation as the Lemon test's "Catch-22." Aid to
sectarian schools must be vigorously policed lest it be put to sectarian use and thereby
violate the effects test. Yet this supervision constitutes an impermissible entanglement.
That of course leaves only one solution: exclude religious schools from receiving
government aid altogether.
Mark J. Beutler, Public Funding of' Sectarian Education: Establishment and Free Exercise Clause
Implications, 2 GEO. MASON INDEPENDENT L. REV. 7, 22-23 (1993).
24. From Everson on the court has recognized the Establishment Clause as incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. The difficulty of this clause being applied
against the states in view of the state churches that existed at the time of the writing of the
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had the freedom to establish or disestablish religion, 25 at the behest of the
citizenry, through political debate and were more pluralistic in their
treatment of other religions within their borders than sometimes assumed. 26
With incorporation this is no longer the case; and uniformity rather than
diversity is enforced on all. 27 With the ever enlarging growth of
government at all levels, the area of the public has increased so that
religious expression finds fewer and fewer places in which one can express
her views without inviting a charge of violation of "separation of church
and state."28

amendment has been answered by Brennan in Schempp,
It has been suggested, with some support in history, that [incorporation of the
establishment clause] is conceptually impossible because the Framers meant the [clause]
also to foreclose any attempt by Congress to disestablish the existing official state
churches. [But] the last of the formal state establishments was dissolved more than three
decades before the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and thus the problem of
protecting official state churches from federal encroachments could hardly have been any
concern of those who framed the post-Civil War Amendments.
Quoted in G. GUNTHER and K. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1466-1467 (13th ed. 1997)
25. The puzzling silence of the federal constitution makes more sense if seen in this light:
[O]ne important function of the First Amendment was to restrain the federal government's
power to interfere with state regulation of religion. The state was the appropriate overseer
of religion under the federal system, and states were assumed to have been left free to
establish, disestablish, or partially establish religion as they saw fit.
ELIZABETH B. CLARK, Church-State Relations in the Constitution-Makin[J Period, in CHURCH AND
STATE IN AMERICA: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL GUIDE: THE COLONIAL AND EARLY NATIONAL PERIOD 157
(John. F. Wilson ed., 1986) (quoted in James J. Knicely, High Wall or Lines of Separation 7 , 6 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 261, 274).
26. Strict separationist Leonard Levy recognizes the truthfulness of this:
Clearly the provisions
. show that to understand the American meaning of "an
establishment of religion" one cannot arbitrarily adopt a definition based on European
experience. In every European precedent of an establishment, the religion established was
that of a single church. Many different churches, or the religion held in common by all
of them, i.e., Christianity or Protestantism, were never simultaneously established by any
European nation. Establishments in America, on the other hand, both in the colonial and
early state periods, were not limited in nature or in meaning to state support of one
church. An establishment of religion in America at the time of the framing of the Bill
of Rights meant government aid ahd sponsorship of religion, principally by impartial tax
support of the institutions of religion, the churches.
Not one of the six American states maintaining establishments of religion at the that time
preferred one church to others in their constitutional law. Even in New England where
the Congregational church was dominant as a result of numerical superiority, there were
constitutional and legal guarantees against subordination or preference. Such an
establishment can hardly be called an exclusive or preferential one, as in the case where
only one church, as in all European precedents, was the beneficiary.
LEONARD W. LEVY, JUDGEMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 201-202 (1972)
27. See Stephen B. Presser, Some Realism about Atheism: Responses to the Godless
Constitution, I TEX. REv. L & PoL 87, 121 (1997) (interacting with the perspectives of Kramnick
and Moore regarding whether the Framers intended a purely secular Constitution and government).
28. The term "separation of church and state" is not found in the First Amendment but if
read literally would more accurately reflect the meaning of the First Amendment, that is. the
separation of the institution of the church from the institution of the state, not speaking to the matter
of the religious influences on governmental views and functions, nor to accommodations or benefits
that the governmental may give to religious citizens and causes which are religious in nature.
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Whether one believes there to be a necessary nexus between law and
religion very likely depends on whether one speaks of law and religion in
the twentieth century or in the earlier periods of our history. As subsequent
analysis will demonstrate, 29 this state of affairs is of recent origin and is
largely due to the development of a world view which has been adopted by
the courts different than that shared by lawyers and judges in the Western
world for the last several hundred years. 30 Until recently, religious
perspectives, particularly Christianity, informed the law, providing the
moral basis for the requirements of right and wrong, truth and falsehood,
that the law requires to have credibility and effectiveness. The reason for
this is that religion informed of all life. As Professor Steven Smith says,
Religious premises, assumptions, and values provided the
general framework within which most Americans thought
about and discussed important philosophical, moral, and
political issues. For that reason, Americans of the time could
not seriously contemplate a thoroughly secular political
culture from which religious beliefs, motives, purposes,
rhetoric, and practices would be filtered out. 31

It is not, however, simply the rejection of Christian morality and the
substitution of another religious persuasion that is at question. Modem law
disavows adherence to any religious basis to its pronouncements whether
in the halls of the legislatures or in the court chambers. Under the guise of
secular versus sacred, modem law is supposedly neutral to religious edicts
of right and wrong in contrast to the important dependence on religious
views for most of recorded history. 32

B. Religion as the Black Sheep of Western Liberty in Modern Law
1.

The marginalization of Christianity, and other religious views, m
America's public square

Christianity has come on hard times in America in contrast to its
pervasive influence on law and culture in the previous two centuries.
Judge Robert Bark says that there is even a fear among many in the

29. See infra text accompanying notes 79-270.
30. See Virginia Armstrong. The Flight From America's Foundations: A Panoramic
Perspective on American Law, in RESTORING THE CoNSTITUTION 103-134 (H. Wayne House ed.,
1987)
31. Steven D. Smith, Separation of the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision. 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 966 (1989).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 59-78.
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general public about the enforcement of Christian morality in the public
square:
It thus appears, at least for society as a whole, that the major
and perhaps only alternative to "intellectual and moral
relativism and/or nihilism" is religious faith. That conclusion
will make many Americans nervous or hostile. While most
people claim to be religious, most are also not comfortable with
those whose faith is strong enough to affect their public
behavior. That can be seen in the reaction of many Americans
to the appearance in the public square of religious
conservatives. A letter to the editor, for example, proclaims,
The "ardor" shown by many people of the religious right is
often intolerance masquerading as principle. In seeking to
impose its ideas about school prayer, abortion and a host of
other issues on society at large, the religious right is pursuing
a program of bigotry and demagoguery that is antithetical to
the U.S.'s pluralistic heritage.
The fear of religion in the public arena is all too typical of
Americans, and particularly the intellectual class, today.
Religious conservatives cannot "impose" their ideas on society
except by the usual democratic methods of trying to build
majorities and passing legislation. In that they are not
different from any other group of people with ideas of what
morality requires. All legislation "imposes" a morality of one
sort or another, and, therefore, on the reasoning offered, all
law would seem to be antithetical to pluralism. The references
to "bigotry" and "demagoguery" seem to mean little more than
that the author would like to impose a very different set of
values. 33

But if religious meaning is divorced from the public arena, this does
not mean that the square will be empty. Rather, other ideologies will vie
for the place of prominence, and often escape notice or scrutiny by the
courts that often look for "holy books" instead of worldviews in defining
religion. Judge Bark anticipates this type of take over.
By removing religion from the public space, we marginalize it;
we deny its importance to society and relegate it to the private
sphere. But if men need a transcendence that can be brought
to bear on public affairs, and if religion is denied that role,
other forms of transcendence, some of them quite ugly and
threatening, may move in to occupy the empty space. In part,

33.

BORK,

supra note 15, al 277.
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that has already happened. Many of the causes of the day from environmentalism to animal rights - are pressed with an
enthusiasm, a zealotry, that can only be called religious, and
sometimes violence has resulted. There is also a splintering of
morality when religion no longer provides a common set of
moral assumptions. 34
In similar tones, Stephen Carter, Yale law professor, believes that the
importance of religious beliefs are minimized alongside of other societal
interests:
In contemporary American culture, the religions are more
and more treated as just passing beliefs - almost as fads,
older, stuffier, less liberal versions of so-called New Age rather than as the fundaments upon which the devout build
their lives. (The noes have it!) And if religions are
fundamental, well, too bad - at least if they're the wrong
fundaments - if they're inconvenient, give them up! If you
can't remarry because you have the wrong religious belief,
well, hey, believe something else! If you can't take your exam
because of a Holy Day, get a new Holy Day! If the government
decides to destroy your sacred lands, just make some other
lands sacred! If you must go to work on your sabbath, it's no
big deal! It's just a day off1 Pick a different one! If you can't
have a blood transfusion because you think God forbids it, no
problem! Get a new God! And through all of this trivializing
rhetoric runs the subtle but unmistakable message: pray if you
like, worship if you must, but whatever you do, do not on any
account take your religion seriously. 35

34. !d. at 274.
35. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF, How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 14-15 (1993). Carter gives some examples of kinds of activities
that are considered taboo in modern liberal thought:
When Hillary Rodham Clinton was seen wearing a cross around her neck at some
of the public events surrounding her husband's inauguration as President of the United
States, many observers were aghast, and one television commentator asked whether it was
appropriate for the First Lady to display so openly a religious symbol. But if the First
Lady can't do it, then certainly the President can't do it, which would bar from ever
holding the office an Orthodox Jew under a religious compulsion to wear a yarmulke.
Back in the mid-1980s, the magazine Sojourners - published by politically liberal
Christian evangelicals - found itself in the unaccustomed position of defending the
conservative evangelist Pat Robertson against secular liberals who, a writer in the
magazine sighed, "see[m] to consider Robertson a dangerous neanderthal because he
happens to believe that God can heal diseases." The point is that the editors of
Sojourners. who are no great admirers of Robertson, also believe that God can heal
diseases. So do tens of millions of Americans. But they are not supposed to say so.
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Religious expression is privatized

Many are open to religion being generally unencumbered by the
government but it must stay out of the public arena to escape the control of
the state. 36 As Bork has stated, "The difficulty is that within the last
several decades, the Supreme Court, at the urging of organizations such as
the ACLU, has read the clause as though it commanded the separation of
religion and society.'m This evolving perspective in the Supreme Court is
found in Lemon, where it declared "[t]he Constitution decrees that religion
must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions
of private choice." 38 The legal community reflects similar thinking, as
illustrated by the comment of Lawrence Friedman that "religion is an
individual choice, a private not a public matter." 39

In the early 1980s, the state of New York adopted legislation that, in effect, requires
an Orthodox Jewish husband seeking a civil divorce to give his wife a get - a religious
divorce - without which she cannot remarry under Jewish law. Civil libertarians attacked
the statute as unconstitutional. Said one critic. the "barriers to remarriage erected by
religious law . . only exist in the minds of those who believe in the religion." If the
barriers are religious, it seems, then that are not real barriers. they are "only" in the
woman's mind - perhaps even a figment of the imagination.
When the Supreme Court of the United States, ostensibly the final refuge of religious
freedom, struck down a Connecticut statute requiring employers to make efforts to allow
their employees to observe the sabbath, one Justice observed that the sabbath should not
be singled out because all employees would like to have "the right to select the day of
the week in which to refrain from bbor." Sounds good, except that, as one scholar has
noted, "It would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he has 'selected the
day of the week in which to refrain from labor,' since the Jewish people have been under
the impression for some 3,000 years that this choice was made by God." lf the sabbath
is just another day off, then religious choice is essentially arbitrary and unimportant; so
if one sabbath day is inconvenient, the religiously devout employee can just choose
another.
... When President Ronald Reagan told religious broadcasters in 1983 that all the laws
passed since biblical times "have 'not improved on the Ten Commandments one bit,"
which might once have been considered a pardonable piece of rhetorical license, he was
excoriated by political pundits, including one who charged angrily that Reagan was giving
"short shrift to the secular laws and institutions that a president is charged with
protecting." And as for the millions of Americans who consider the Ten Commandments
the fundaments on which they build their lives, well, they arc no doubt subversive of
these same institutions.
/d. at 4-6.
36. See R. Randall Rainey, Law and Religion: Is Reconciliation Still Possible, 27 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 147, 166-170 (1993) for an interaction with the preclusion of religious arguments from
public debate.
37. BORK, supra note 15, at 289.
38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602. 625 ( 1971 ). Richard S Myers, The Supreme Court
and the Privatization of' Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 36 (1991 ), believes that the privatization
in regards to religious school issues is losing influence on the Court.
39. LAWRENCE MEIR FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE 165 ( 1990), quoted in Myers,
supra note 38, at note 14. Observe the comment of the attorney general of New York, who speaking
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Hostility against religious influence in American society

Professor Kent Greenawalt has described the kind of hostility that
exists in certain elements of society: "A good many professors and other
intellectuals display a hostility or skeptical indifference to religion that
amounts to thinly disguised contempt for the belief in any reality beyond
that discoverable by scientific inquiry and ordinary human experience."40
Professor Randall Rainey has suggested that such persons may be
classified as "enlightenment or liberal fundamentalists." He says that he
uses the term
as a general term to describe the tenancy of a certain strand of
liberal thought to oppose the nontheocratic presence of religion
in the political life of the community . . . . [T]he term is
intended to describe that variant of liberalism that reveals,
with varying degrees of intensity, an antireligious "stance" or
"disposition." While this stance may not be cast as a full
position, it may readily be discerned as an "undercurrent" in
the treatment of religion in a variety of disciplines, including
law. 41

When one speaks of legislating moralit/ 2 or of the impact of a judges'
religious worldview on her judicial decisions, 43 or actions of the

against the claims of those who advocated their freedom of speech had been violated on the basis
of content:
[u]nlike the community purposes for which authority is designated in the statute, religion
is an "individual experience," that is "inviolately private." Religion "must be a private
matter for the individual." Religious advocacy, like petitioners' effort to persuade the
community residents to "instill" "Christian values" in their children "from an early age,"
serves the community only in the eyes of its adherents and yields a benefit only to those
who already believe.
Brief for Respondent Attorney General at 24, Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist. (quoted in Michael W. McConnell, God is Dead and We Have Killed Him'.· Freedom of
Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 163, 165 (1993)). See Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
40. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION AND POLITICAL CHOICE 6 (1998).
41. Rainey, supra note 36, at 154 (1993).
42. See generally NORMAN GEISLER & FRANK TUREK, LEGISLATING MORALITY (1998) (arguing
that the legislation of morality is inevitable).
43. See generally Smith v. Board of School Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939 (S. D. Ala. 1987),
reprinted in AMERICAN EDUCATION ON TRIAL: IS SECULAR HUMANISM A RELIGION? (The opinion of
Judge W Brevard Hand in the Alabama Textbook Case) (Center for Judicial Studies 1987)
(attempting to overturn the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause interpretation in a district court
decision) and Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (holding that a daily period of silence in public
schools for meditation or voluntary prayer was violation of the establishment clause); See the
following essays which demonstrate the degree to which judicial decisions and legislative enactments
are influenced by religious views of the judges and legislators: Scott C. Idleman, The Role of
Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433 (1993); Stephen L. Carter, The
Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932 (1989); Kent Greenawalt, Religious

216

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 13

government that affect religion, the issue is not whether religion and these
areas mix but to what degree they mix.
Belief that a secular state must be separated from the sacred, 44 - that
legal perspectives and laws must not be unduly influenced by religious
ideology - puts people of faith and their perspectives in a second class
status in American culture. They are at the best tolerated. 45 But some
religious sentiments are not even tolerated. Judge Bork speaks of the
manner in which the journalistic guild reacted to religious statements made
by Governor Mario Cuomo:
Journalist Fred Barnes, for example, reports a dinner with
then Governor Mario Cuomo and a dozen journalists during
which Cuomo said he sent his children to Catholic schools
because "The public schools inculcate a disbelief in God."
Barnes wrote, "From the reaction of my colleagues, one might
have thought Cuomo had advocated mandatory snakehandling as a test of faith for the state's students." They
peppered the Governor with dozens of hostile questions. There
is, Barnes says, a "peculiar bias in mainstream American
journalism against traditional religions . . . . [W]henever
religion comes in contact with politics or public policy, as it
increasingly does, the news media reacts in three distinct
ways, all negative. Reporters treat religion as beneath
mention, as personally distasteful, or as a clear and present
threat to the American way of life." 46

Convictions and Law MakinK, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1985).
44. An interesting problem with the terms "secular" and "sacred" is that the Coun desires to
be secular, a term defined in the dictionary as "irreligion" or non-religious. Yet II advocates that it
is neutral between religion and irreligion. This seems to be like the fox in the henhouse saying he
is neutral between whether chickens should be eaten or not. In reality, the Coun C<m never be truly
or absolute neutral. See Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case .fin Government Cooperation with
Faith-Based Social Service Prol'iders, 46 EMORY L.J. I ( 1997). "Indeed, to demand that any theory
of church/state relations transcend its pedigree or its presuppositions and be substantively neutral is
to ask the impossible." ld. at 2.
45. Myers speaks of tolerance as the "sense of grudging concession to a practice of which
one disapproves." Myers, su1m1 note 38, at n.46. He continues,
It is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the public
schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of American citizens in an
atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any son ~ an atmosphere
in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American groups and
religions. This is a heritage neither theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic and
patriotic
. The Court's enthusiasm for government indoctrination and distrust for
religious indoctrination IS instructive. It now seems generally recognized that the public
schools are not religiously neutral.

!d.
46.

BORK, supra note 15, at 291
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Another significant example is the response to the religious remarks of
Justice Antonio Scalia, which he made in a non-judicial private setting
about the requirement of Christian sacrifice. Paulsen and Johnson give as
assessment of these seemingly alarmist responses:
In our judgment, Scalia's remarks - and especially the
remarkable reaction they elicited - do indeed have much to
say about open-mindedness, tolerance, objectivity, and judicial
ethics. But the lessons they teach are precisely the opposite of
those urged by Scalia's critics. The reactions to Antonin
Scalia's prayer breakfast homily reflect a shocking ignorance
about Christian theology and biblical literature, about the
First Amendment's protections of freedom of speech and of
religion, and about the role of religion (and personal
statements about religion) in a pluralistic public square. 47

Though separatists in the media or the courts are desirous to limit the
influence of religion in the public square, particularly the public schools,
they are not as fastidious about other ideologies. McConnell seeks to
explain the way in which secularists view the religious impulse:
From a secular point of view, it is difficult to appreciate the
religious impulse. Faith seems antithetical to reason and
obedience to higher authority seems submissive and
antidemocratic. A liberalism based on individualism,
independence, and rationalism thus has a tendency to see
traditional religion as authoritarian, irrational, and divisiveas a potential threat to our democratic institutions rather than
as one of their sturdiest pillars, as was typically thought at the
Founding. Today, it is not unusual to find law professors
writing that religions "undermine rather than mutually
reinforce habits of mind necessary for democratic decisionmaking," or that religion is "fundamentally incompatible with
[the] intellectual cornerstone of the modern democratic state."
Justice John Paul Stevens has called religions "divisive forces"
and told us that it is vital to keep these forces out of our public
schools - even when the religious activity in question is
voluntary, extracurricular, and student-initiated. This, he
says, is because the schools are "the symbol of our democracy
and the most pervasive means of promoting our common
destiny." Needless to say, modern liberals see no need to keep
other "divisive forces" out of the schools. Indeed they are the
first to protest "censorship" when Soul on Ice or books

47. Michael Stokes Paulsen & Steffen N. Johnson. Scalia·.,. Sermonette. 72 NoTRE DAME L.
REV. 863. 866 (1997)
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containing vulgar and offensive language are removed from
the curriculum. 48

The hostility has grown to the degree that the free exercise clause has
been turned on its head, with the concern being "freedom from religion"
rather than "freedom of religion." McConnell elucidates this theme:
With such a change in perspective, freedom of religion came to
be seen as less important than freedom from religion. It is
revealing that Felix Frankfurter, the prototypical liberal of
this school, described religious freedom as "freedom from
conformity to religious dogma," and Justice Harry Blackmun
describes the Establishment Clause as protecting "secular
liberty" (not "religious liberty"). This is a far cry from those
who understood religious freedom as willing obedience to the
sovereignty of God, and gave it pride of place in our First
Amendment. 49

A contemporary example of this view of "religious liberty" is found in
an Oregon case, Meltebeke v. BOL/. 50 The state of Oregon argued that an
employer who had "witnessed" to an employee at least twice per week for
a period of a month both on and off the job and to employee's relatives
and fiance and labeled employee "sinner" because his lifestyle did not
conform to employer's religious beliefs was in violation of "religious
harassment." 51 Whereas the state regulation 52 seemly was written to protect
an employed person from being harassed by his employer because of the
employed person's religion, BOLl and the ACLU argued that it was a
prohibition of a person with religious conviction (here the employer) from
harassing another (with no stated religious conviction) because of the
employer's religious views. The dissent in the case creates a new right,
"freedom from religion":
Freedom from religious harassment exists for atheists,
agnostics and the nonobservant, as well as for the
demonstrably religious. For many, freedom from religion is as
important as freedom to practice religion. I believe freedom
from religion is entitled to the same level of constitutional,
statutory and administrative protection in the workplace. I

48. McConnell, supra note 39, at 173-174.
49. !d. at 174.
50. Meltebeke v. BOLl, 120 Or. App 273 (1993), ufj'd, 322 Or. 132 (Or Sup. Ct) (1995)
51. !d. at 273.
.[l]t is an unlawful employment
52. The statute reads: "ORS 659.030(l)(b): (l)
practice:
.(b) For an employer, because of an individual's . . religion, . . to discrimmate
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment."
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also do not agree with the lead opinion that an intent element
is essential in order to uphold BOLl's rule from a facial or an
as-applied attack. I am not sure how intent could ever be
shown in this context.
While it is true that Oregon's guarantees of religious
freedom are intended to permit minorities to engage in
religious practices that the majority might find objectionable,
what occurred here went far beyond the mere providing of
religious information. I would therefore hold that the intensity
of uninvited religious proselytizing by the employer in this
case constituted common harassment and religious
discrimination within the meaning of the rule and the statute,
and that such conduct is not constitutionally protected. 53

Though the Court has traditionally recognized the importance of not
taking sides in regards to religion or irreligion in Establishment Clause
cases where governmental action is in view, the new "freedom from
religion" carries such a view into the private sphere. One could ask
whether "freedom from speech" would establish no speech zones, so that if
one walks into a discussion that one does not like the discussion must stop
since the offended party's freedom from speech must be honored. Or
perhaps, if one joins a group in which the new person entering the group
does not like one of the parties, the unliked person must leave to fulfill the
new person's "freedom from association." Though the Jaw recognizes that
all freedoms have limitations, it does not usually acknowledge that the
rights of the Bill of Rights are negatives rather than positives.
4.

Denial of America's Christian heritage

One might ask why Christian values should have any more moral
authority than any other competing system? The obvious response is that
this is primarily the underlying substructure of American law, society, and
culture that has served the country well. In addition, to change the moral
foundation of the nation may undermine the liberty that such a foundation
has provided. To counter such a claim, some have argued that the intention
of the Framers was to create a "godless constitution" to minimize the
influence of Christianity in the formation of the new govemment. 54 This
perspective is countered by a large amount of evidence to the contrary, as
Presser explains,

/d. at 293 (Riggs. J. dissenting).
See generally ISAAC KRAMNICK & R. LAURENCE MOORE, THE GODLESS CONSTITUTION: THE
CASE AGAINST RELIGIOUS CORRECTNESS (1996).

53.
54.
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Indeed, the commonplace view until very recently that the
United States was a "Christian Nation" was repeatedly
acknowledged by the United States Supreme Court and on
countless public occasions by spokesmen for a myriad of
political views. For most of our history, then, most of our
leaders appeared not to have believed in a Godless constitution
at all. 55

Though certainly I would support a broad understanding of religious
freedom in our pluralistic society today, it is flawed thinking that the
Constitution does not have a particular religious worldview standing
behind it. The Framer's had inherited perspectives from both the
conservative enlightenment, especially in the thinking of John Locke, 56 and
heavy reliance on the Bible and western Christianity. The Declaration of
Independence and the permeation of broad (non-sectarian) views of the
nature of God and reality both underlie the document that sets order to the
state that formed in 1776. 57

II. ONCE UPON A TIME: THE CHRISTIAN PAST IN THE WEST AND THE PREEVERSON AMERICA

Though there are some who would deny the reliance of American law
and government on its Christian roots, this position is hard to sustain. It is
not within the intent of this article to give a comprehensive presentation of
data regarding the Christian influences on Western law but I will provide a
few examples of how this influence played out in the Europe, England,
and America. 58

55. See Presser, supra note 27, at 91 (interacting with the perspectives of Kramnick and
Moore). Also see the interaction between Kramnick and Moore and Dreisbach. See Isaac Kramnick
and R. Laurence Moore, Our Godless Constitution, LIBERTY 12 (May/June 1996); Daniel L.
Dreisbach, A Godless Constitution, LIBERTY II (Nov/Dec 1996); Dreisbach, LIBERTY 2 (March/April
1996). See al.w DanielL. Dreisbach, In Search of a Christian Commonwealth: An Examination of
Selected Nineteenth-Century Commentaries on References to God and the Christian Religion in the
United States Constitution, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 927 (1996).
56. See infra text accompanying footnotes 82-102.
57. It is a mistake to believe that the Constitution is the beginning of the American
government. In reality, the wording of the Declaration itself reveals that the Framers of that
document viewed themselves as beginning a new government, and the Constitution itself assumes
the Declaration as the beginning of the government. See infra text accompanying notes 144-55.
58. An interesting tidbit of how reference to Christian ideals impacted decisions in law is
found in an interaction between some bishops and monks in the middle ages:
[A] key question arose in the manuscripters: Which form of legal record is the more
reliable, oral or written? A historical anecdote involving the investitute controversy
between the Archbishop of Canterbury's monks and the bishops of King Henry I depicts
the struggle between orality and literacy that characterized the law at the midpoint of the
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A. Religious Foundations of Law and Government in Western Europe
One would search long and hard for a society in the ancient
Mesopotamian or Mediterranean world in which religion and the religious
cultus were not inextricably connected to the functions of the state. 59 In the
words of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, "[N]o state was ever founded without
having religion as its basis." 6° For example, Greek religion was connected
to the religious preferences of the city-state as Socrates discovered. 61 In
Rome, religion was identified with the state, especially the state cult, so
that the state religion, with occasional tributes to the gods of Greece and
Rome, was primarily dedicated to the genus of the emperor who embodied
the divine Rome. 62 Linder comments on the Roman civil religion:
The Roman Empire provides an even clearer example of the
concept of civil religion in ancient times. The Roman state cult
under the emperors served as the civil religion of the realm.
Various particular religions existed alongside it, and their
adherents could practice as enthusiastically as they pleased as
long as they gave nominal acceptance to the state cult. But
this nominal acceptance was obligatory. Further, the position
of the emperor made the state cult something of a peculiarity.
He was both pontifex maximus (chief priest) of the state cult

scribal period:
Anselm's monks: "But what about the evidence of the letters?"
Henry's bishops: "As we don't accept evidence of monks against bishops, why
should we accept that of a sheepskin?"
Anselm's monks: "Shame on you' Are not the Gospels written down on sheepskins?"
M.T. CLANCHY, FROM MEMORY TO WRITTEN RECORD: ENGLAND I 066-1307 209 ( 1979) (quoted in
Ronald K. L. Collins & David M. Skover. Paratexts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 509, 528 (1992))
59. See Kirk for his discussion of the glory and ruin of the Greek world, particularly its
religious views that could not serve as the basis of lasting liberty and equality. RuSSELL KIRK, THE
ROOTS OF AMERICAN ORDER 51-96 (1991).
60. Quoted in Linder, Civil Religion in Historical Perspective: The Reality that Underlies the
Concept, 17 J. CHURCH AND STATE 399, 403 (1975).
61
Socrates was condemned by an Athenian jury in 399 B.C. on a charge of "introducing
strange gods and corrupting the youth of the city-state. Whether or not these were trumped up
charges against a man who had professed reverence for the laws of Athens, there is no doubt that
he had attacked the religio-political order of the day." /d. at 405-06.
62. See EVERETT FERGUSON, BACKGROUNDS OF EARLY CHRISTIANITY 153-165 (1987) for a
look at the "ruler cult" in the Hellenistic world, culminating in the Roman emperor cult. H. Brown
elucidates this perspective:
The Roman republic began as a city-state with authority residing in an assembly and with
the people, symbolically expressed by the political tetragrammaton SPQR. Senatus
Populusque Romanorum, "the Senate and the People of the Romans", but as its reach
(das Reich) spread across the Mediterranean world, it was symbolized as the dominium
(lordship) of a single man, the emperor.
H. Brown, Civil Authority and the Bible, in THE CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAW 112 (H. Wayne
House ed., 1998).

222

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 13

and, after the first century A.D., increasingly an object of
adoration and worship himself. 63

The connection of religion with the state is also true with the Roman
world of the fourth century on. With the triumph of Christianity in the
Roman Empire the tie of this new faith to Roman law seemed a natural
pair. Christianity already had a natural affinity to law in view of the Old
Testament so that, as Ullmann has said regarding Roman law, "the law,
could, as indeed it did, effortless penetrate into the very matrix of the
rapidly growing Christian doctrinal body." 64 One early Christian apologist
especially helped the church take Roman law under its wings, namely
Tertullian. He was a Roman jurist and shaped religious ideas into legal
forms in his writings. He believed that the relationship between God and
man was a legal relation cast in terms of rights and duties and he often
used contemporary Roman legal terms to explain Christian theology. 65
Several ideas in Roman law were consistent with Christian theology.
One especially important was the monotheistic nature of Christianity. The
monarchic idea was important to the later Roman emperors but became
pivotal to Constantine. Ullmann observes,
By himself striking up monotheistic chords, Constantine
anticipated the response of the Christians who since the end of
the first century had held that a clear distinction must be
drawn between the person of the emperor and his
governmental power. This view was a concrete application of
the Pauline thesis as enunciated in the letter to the
Romans . . . . Their stern and uncompromising attitude
towards the "divinity" of the emperor's person sharply
contrasted with their equally uncompromising affirmation of
the divine origin of the emperor's governmental power. 66

By the time that Theodosius I decreed that the Christian religion was
the only recognized religion throughout the empire, the union of the
church and state had become a reality. Ecclesiastical officers were
appointed public officials; church councils were called by the emperor.
The way in which the church so readily identified with the governmental
structure became a new theology:

63.

Linder,

supra

note

60,

at

406. See

~:enerally MICHAEL AUCKLAND SMITH. FROM CHRIST

TO CONSTANTINE 74-91 (1971); ETHELBERT STAUFFER, CHRIST AND THE CAESARS (trans

K.

and R.

Smith, 1955); and AN. SHERWIN-WHITE, ROMAN SOCIETY AND ROMAN LAw IN THE NEW TESTAMENT

(1963).
64. WALTER ULLMANN,
65. !d. at 32-33.
66. !d. at 35.

LAW AND POLITICS IN THE MIDDLE AGES

32

(1975)
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[T]he Church universal was a new society altogether,
composed as it was of beings who through baptism had shed
their "naturalness" and had become "new creatures", "new
men" altogether. By losing their naturalness, they had entered
a divinely created society - the Church - which followed its
own principles, its own norms; in short, to the "new creature"
corresponded a new society and new way of life, the novitas
vitae. Its basis was the Bible. Its members were subjected to
the laws as given by divinity and made known through the
qualified officers. And one of the conclusions that was drawn,
concerned the very question of government. Here it was above
all the papacy which was able to call upon a respectable body
of scholarly opinion . . . supported as it was by its own
governmental manifestations in the shape of decretals which
authoritatively claimed that this new society must be governed
in accord with biblical precept. 67

Possibly as important as the Christian doctrine which found its way
easily in the Roman law was the vehicle for that transmission, the Vulgate.
By the tum of the fourth and fifth centuries Jerome's Latin translation
became the source of governmental thoughts in the Middle Ages. Latin
was the language of the cultured and educated classes of the late fourth
century. Jerome's translation of the Hebrew and Greek Testaments was
filled with Roman terminology - made easier by the legal terminology of
the Old Testament but also found in Paul's terminology in the New. The
Latin Bible and the belief in the totality of the Christian life, even into the
body politic created a virtual monopoly for church men. 68
This reliance on the Vulgate had impact for centuries, affecting even
the development of Anglo-Saxon law in the seventh and eighth centuries.
The Bible became the one common bond between the various nations,
provinces, and regions of Western Europe. The God of the Bible became
the great lawgiver to the different societies.
For it was axiomatic within the monotheistic framework
that God was the governing organ of the cosmos. But this
organ was not accessible to any subjective-human evaluations
of a moral order or on a moral plane. What divinity had laid
down, enacted, in short created, was unchangeable. There was
a singularly unanimous agreement that the cosmos was based
on an immutable, objective order, precisely because it
emanated from absolute divinity. Consequently, the law that

67.

68.

!d.

at 39.
/d. at 42-43.
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manipulated the cosmos partook of the objective features of
the cosmos. On this basis human law could not contradict
divine law as demonstrated in the Bible, and in some respects
became, when once issued, part of the world order itself. In the
last resort this is the explanation of why law in the Middle
Ages assumed so crucial and overriding a role and was viewed
with a respect which it has never since enjoyed. 69

Though this union of Roman law began after the time of Constantine,
it reached fulfillment in the reign of the emperor Justinian, who in
approximately A.D. 534 had a massive collection of legal materials
compiled which wedded Christianity with Roman law. Though often
known as the Justinian Code, 70 it included more than the laws of Justinian.
After the fall of the west to barbarian hordes, 71 Roman law and Christian
theology was still joined and was adopted by the largely Christian
barbarians but it was not systematized. 72 This systematization began
around the year A.D. 1100 due to the beginning of the first modem law
school in the town of Bologna in Northern Italy. Thousands of students
each year from all over Europe came to this school to study law as a
"distinct and coherent body of knowledge." 73 But what law was studied? It
was the works of Justinian and thus the Christianized Roman law served as
the foundation for the civil law of Western Europe. 74
There were a few other influences on the development of the law in
Europe, England and America that should not go unmentioned before we
must proceed to the major influence on American law, the common law of
England. Important rulers such as Charlemagne75 and Alfred the Greif

69.
70.

/d. at 46.
Berman provides a breakdown of the Justinian material:

The manuscript consisted of four parts: (I) the Code (Codex). comprising twelve books
of ordinances and decisions of the Roman Emperors before Justinian; (2J the Novels
(Novellae). containing the laws promulgated by Emperor Justinian himself; (3) the
Institutes (lnstitutiones), a short textbook designed as an introduction for beginning law
students; and (4) the Digest (Digestum), whose 50 books contain a multitude of extracts
from the opinions of Roman jurists on a wide variety of legal questions. In a modern
English translation, the Code takes up I ,034 pages, the Novels 562 pages, the Institutes
173 pages, and the Digest 2,734 pages.
HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION 37. n.2 ( 1993)
(citing THE CIVIL LAW (Samuel P. Scotted., 1932)).
71. See generally RICHARD FLETCHER, THE BARBARIAN CONVERSION: FROM PAGANISM TO
CHRISTIANITY (1997).
72. BERMAN, supra note 70, at 36.
73. !d. at 37.
74. For more discussion on this point see id. at 35-53.
75. G. de Suvigny explains how Charlemagne understood biblical law and applied it to his
rule:
Charles saw the state as more than the king's private property. He was strongly
influenced by the ideas of St. Augustine and the Old Testament, and felt a responsibility
to create an ordered, harmonious society in which all men could work together toward
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sought to codify biblical law into the secular laws in their realms, and the
Magna Carta, 77 called the "fountainhead of Anglo-American liberty" 78 also
placed a big part of the evolution of Western law.

B. Major Influences on American Law
Christianity had various influences on the development of Western
law. It was embedded in the common law, 79 provided the basis to

eternal salvation. To achieve Christian concord, he labored to discover the causes of
disorder and injustice. He issued a flood of laws, call capitularies, to correct abuses and
prevent their reoccun·ence. He imposed on his local agents, the courts, the responsibility
to enact these Jaws and do justice to all who had complaints .... This activity did much
to bring order and justice out of the political chaos that had plagued the Frankish state
at an earlier age.
EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 26 (quoting G. DE BERRIER DE SAUVIGNY, 3 NEW CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 498 (1967)).
76. Berman speaks of Alfred's codification of biblical law:
The Laws of Alfred (about A.D. 890) start with a recitation of the Ten Commandments
and excerpts from the Mosaic Law; and in restating and revising the native Anglo-Saxon
Jaws. Alfred includes such great principles as: "doom (i.e. judge) very evenly; doom not
on doom to the rich, another to the poor; nor doom one to your friend, another to your
foe" (cf Exodus 23:1-3; Deut. 1·16-18).
HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 55 (1974).
77. Originally spelled Charta.
78. EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 27. Eidsmoe, quoting T. Dufwa, says,
Among the parallels Silving notes between the Bible and the Magna Carta are the "selfcurse" found in both documents, the fear of monarchy and requirement that the king
adhere to the law found in the Magna Carta and in Deuteronomy 17, the power of
excommunication or being "cut off from the people," the land as a sanctioning agent
under an oath, the requirement that law be clearly written (Deut. 27:8) and clearly
explained (Deut. 1:5), limitations upon punishment (Deut. 25:1-3), like punishment for
perjury in criminal cases (Deut 13: 15; 19: 17-21 ); (Magna Carta Leonesa, articles 12-13),
and the covenant as the ultimate source of authority.
/d. at 28, citing HELEN SILV!NG, SOURCES OF LAW 243-248 (1968).
Eidsmoe draws one other interesting observation about influence on the Magna Carta, and
consequently on English common Jaw, that of the Vikings:
In the ninth century the Danes and Norwegians held considerable portions of England,
Scotland, and Ireland. There was a boundary in England, the north of which was called
the "Danelaw" where viking law held sway. Thamar E. Dufwa has traced the effect of
viking law upon the Magna Carta, comparing the wording of portions of the viking law
to portions of the Magna Carta and demonstrating that the noblemen who forced King
John to sign the Magna Carta in 1215 A.D. came mostly from the area north of the
Danelaw where the vikings had ruled several centuries earlier. The highly individualistic
character of viking law is reflected in the Magna Carta and in English and American
institutions today.
EIDSMOE, at 27 (citing THAMAR E. DUFWA, THE VIKING LAWS AND THE MAGNA CARTA: A STUDY
OF THE NORTHMEN'S CULTURAL INFLUENCE ON ENGLAND AND FRANCE 39-92 (1963)).
79. CHING-HSIUNG Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE 64 (1955), quoted in Virginia C. Armstrong,
Law, Politics & the Social Sciences~A Troubled Trinity, 4 SIMON GREENLEAF L. REV. 131 (1984l985)("the common law has one advantage over the legal system of any country: it was Christian
from the very beginning of its history"); see generally Stuart Banner, When Christianity was Part
of the Common Law, 16 LAW & HIST. REV 27 (1998) (arguing that the relation of common law to

226

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 13

understand the relationship of criminal law and punishment, 80 and has
even been recognized by the American Bar Association as having been the
root of tort law. 81
1.

The influence of John Locke

At least five major direct influences fell upon the development of
American law, with the legal history found in the above discussion serving
as a shadow upon the picture of American law and liberty. These five are
the conservative enlightenment as manifested in John Locke, the common
law of England, the influence of Sir William Blackstone, the influence of
the Bible itself, and the impact of the Protestant Reformation. 82
John Locke is generally considered by American historians and legal
scholars alike as a major influence on the leaders of the American
Revolution. Carl Becker presents this view of Locke:
So far as the "Fathers" were, before 1776, directly influenced
by particular writers, the writers were English, and notably
Locke. Most Americans had absorbed Locke's works as a kind
of political gospel; and the Declaration, in its form, in its
phraseology, follows closely certain sentences in Locke's second
treatise on government. 83
Though Locke certainly had importance in the formulation of ideas in the
Framers of the Declaration of Independence, his ideas of social contract
had been practiced in the American colonists at least half a century before
he published his work. 84 Moreover, though Locke discusses rights in his
work, his Second Treatise on Government contains none of the things

Christianity, though true, was not controlling in the development of the law).
80. John E. Witte & Thomas C. Arthur, The Three Uses ol the Law: A Protesta!l/ Source
of the Purposes of Criminal Punishment'· I 0 J .L. & RELIGION 433 (arguing that the third use of the
law in Refmmation theology, the moral law. provided a basis for the use of punishment in cmmnal
law).
81
Special Committee on the Tm1 Liability System, Towards a Jurisprude11ce of Injun· The
Conrinuing Creation o{a System of Substantive Justice in American Tort Law, Committee's Preface
( 1984), quoted in Douglas H. Cook, Negligence or Strict Liability' A Study in Biblical Tort L,m,
13 WHITTIER L. REV. l (I '!92):
So far as we know. there is no word in the Bible for "torts." Yet the "norms" which the
Creator told Moses to set before the Israelites, in the chapter of Exodus following the Ten
Commandments, arc filled with what we think of as "tort" rules
We have indicated
the depth of the roots of tort law in the Judea-Christian tradition.

!d.
82.
that these
83.
84.
shores of
American

This is not to deny that there other influences on various Framers of the government hut
were the major sources of influence on the matter of law and religion.
CARL BECKER, THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 27 ( 1922, 1942).
The concepts of compact or covenant were well known by the people who came to the
America. See generally, Donald S. Lutz, Religious Dimensions in the Development of
Constitutionalism. 39 EMORY U. 21 (I '!90).

203]

A TALE OF TWO KINGDOMS

227

found in the Bill of Rights. American colonists had developed their sense
of rights, not from Locke, but from the Bible. 85
John Locke was not a radical reformer. He grew up in a Puritan home
and held strong views on man, sin, and God from that context. His first
volume on civil government, upon which the second builds, uses Scripture
as a basis of argument. 86 Some of Locke's views did not mesh with the
Puritan theology of his upbringing, such as his perspectives on the "state
of nature" (some problems here with the biblical creation account) and the
acceptance of the tabula rasa, "blank slate" (in contrast to the Calvinist,
thus Puritan, doctrine of original sin). 87 Nonetheless, he did accept special
creation and even wrote an important work on the "reasonableness of
Christianity", 88 including the authority of the Bible: "The Bible is one of
the greatest blessings bestowed by God on the children of men. - It has
God for its author; salvation for its end, and truth without any mixture for
its matter. - It is all pure, all sincere; nothing too much; nothing
wanting. " 89
In reference to the matter of law and government, Locke believed that
the "law of nature" had its source and authority in the Creator:
Thus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal Rule to all
Men, Legislators as well as others. The Rules that they make
for other Men's Actions, be conformable to the Law of Nature,
i.e., to the Will of God, of which that is a Declaration, and the
fundamental Law of Nature being preservation of Mankind, no
Human Sanction can be good, or valid against it. 90

Locke, accordingly, as Blackstone at a later time, 91 did not see the law
of nature as incompatible with the Bible (the law of God):
Human Laws are measures in respect of Men whose
Actions they must direct, albeit such measures they are as
have also their higher Rules to be measured by, which Rules
are two, the Law of God, and the Law of Nature; so that Laws
Human must be made according to the general Laws of

85. ld. at 39-40 (1990) (arguing that as a covenantal people religion is an important
background to politics but should not be involved with the Constitution proper).
86. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 7-118 (ed. Thomas I. Cook. 1947).
87. EIDSMOE, supra note 17. at 38.
88. See comments of Hall and references. VERNA M. HALL, THE CHRISTIAN HISTORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 56 ( 1966).
89. THE NEW DICTIONARY OF THOUGHTS- A CYCLOPEDIA OF QUOTATIONS 46 (C.H. Catrevas
et aL eds .• 1891). quoted in FEDERER, supra note 2, at 399.
90. JOHN LOCKE, OF CiVIL GOVERNMENT 94, quoted in EIDSMOE, supra note 17. at 39.
91. See infra text accompanying note 125.
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Nature, and without contradiction to any positive Law of
Scripture, otherwise they are ill made. 92
It is interesting to compare Locke's terms "law of God" and "law of
nature". This is very close to the statements of the declaration of "the laws
of nature and [the laws] of nature's God." 93 This would seem to be an
affirmation of what was true in both Locke and Blackstone, that nature and
the Bible serve as the basis of the liberty to which God calls his creatures
based on their creation with certain inalienable rights. 94 At another
instance Locke identified the "law of nature" with Scripture: "And upon
this is grounded the great Law of Nature, whoso sheddeth Man's Blood by
Man shall his Blood be shed,"95 quoting Genesis 9:6.
John Locke is well known for his views on social contract. J.
Budziszewski gives a helpful breakdown of the logic developing Locke's
perspective:

To have a government is to have known, authorized,
impartial judges over all, whose judgments can be "executed"
or enforced.
In the beginning, however, there is no government. This is
not just our original condition but our natural condition - our
state of nature.
Having no government does not mean moral chaos because
the state of nature has a law of nature to govern it.
But the fact that people recognize the law of nature does
not mean that they always obey it, so it must be enforced.
Enforcement of the natural law means especially
enforcement of natural rights, probably because individuals
are responsible only to God in points of natural law that do not
affect others.
Enforcement also entails imposing punishments, provided
they do not exceed the natural-law limits of reparation and
restraint- that is, provided that they do not go beyond what is
necessary for compensation of damages and prevention of
further wrongdoing.
But because there is no government, each person is
himself an "executioner" or enforcer of the law of nature.
Now, even when a person knows the principles that ought
to be enforced, he finds it difficult to apply them with coolness
and impartiality when his own interests are concerned.

92.
93.
94.
95.

Quoted in EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 40.
The Declaration of Independence para. I (U.S. 1776).
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
See LocKE, supra note 90, at 60 (quoted in EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 40)
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For this reason, self-enforcement does not work very well;
natural rights are persistently violated, and in punishment the
limits of reparation and restraint are persistently
transgressed.
The remedy for this inconvenience is for all the people in a
particular area to appoint certain persons to serve as impartial
judges - to be a government.
But this does not work unless the judges can enforce their
judgments, and they cannot enforce their judgements unless
people first agree to transfer their "executive," or enforcement,
power to the community as a whole.
The mutual promise or agreement that transfers the
enforcement power to the community as a whole is called the
social covenant, or social contract. Once this agreement is
made, people are said to have left the state of nature and
entered the state of civil society.
Entering civil society is not the same thing as setting up a
government. There is no going back on the agreement to enter
civil society; however, the people can change their minds about
the proper form of government. 96

Not only in his view of the law of nature, but also in social contract,
Locke recognized its divine origin and authority. To support his view, he
cited a speech made by King James I in 1609 to Parliament, in which the
King recognized the source of the contract in the covenant between God
and Noah:
And again, in his speech to the parliament 1609, he hath these
Words, The King bind himself by a double Oath, to the
Observation of the fundamental Laws of his Kingdom. Tacitly,
as by being a King, and so bound to protect as well the People,
as the Laws of the Kingdom, and expressly by his Oath at his
Coronation; so as every just King, in a settled Kingdom, is
bound to observe the Paction made to his People, by his Laws
in framing his Government agreeable Thereunto, according to
that Paction which God made with Noah after the Deluge.
Hereafter, seed Time and Harvest, and Cold and Heat, and
Summer and Winter, and Day and Night, shall not cease
which the Earth remaineth. And therefore a King governing in
a settled Kingdom, leaves to be a King, and degenerates into a
Tyrant, as soon as he leaves off to rule according to his Laws. 97

96. J. BUDZISZEWSKI. WRJTIEN ON THE HEART: THE
97. "'King James I Speaks to Parliament 1609," in
by Locke)

98-99 (1997).
supra note 88, at 112 (as quoted

CASE FOR NATURAL LAW
HALL.
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The common law tradition and Christianity

A second significant influence on the American Jaw of the eighteenth
century, even until today, is the common Jaw. When William of Normandy
conquered England in 1066 he found a nation already rich in culture,
including a well developed law, unlike what was true of Normandy. He
pledged to these Englishmen that they could keep their Jaw. Certainly there
were elements from the more warlike Normans that came into England,
such as trial by battle, and the ecclesiastical courts were separated from the
shires and hundreds, 98 as well as an oppressive 'forest Jaw' protecting the
royal hunt, 99 causing many of us to recall the legendary Robin Hood and
his merry men in Sherwood forest. The common Jaw emerged in the
twelfth century from institutions that had been in elementary form prior to
1066. The Jaws of the English combined with the strong suit of Normans
for administration 100 eventually developed into the court systems that
dispensed judge-made Jaw, called common law.
"[W]hile the Roman law was a deathbed convert to Christianity, the
common law was a cradle Christian" 101 wrote John C.H. Wu. Wu, an
international statesman, jurist and law professor, demonstrated the
accuracy of his claim by tracing the history of the English common law
from Bracton to Blackstone. 102 As important to the common law as men

98. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY ]] (1979). Eidsmoe says
regarding the law of the Anglo-Saxons prior to the Norman conquest:
These early Anglo-Saxons maintained a legal and political system very much similar
to that of Old Testament Israel. They had a system of decentralized government in which
the head of ten families was called a tithing man, the head of fifty families was called
a vii-man, the head of a hundred families was called a hundred-man. and the head of a
thousand families was called an eolderman, later shortened to earl
The earl
governed a territory called a shire, and his assistant was called a "shire reef," later
shortened to sheriff.
EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 26 (citing W. CLEON SKOUSEN, MIRACLE Or AMERICA STUDY GUIIll· 20
(1981)). See also BAKER, supra at 12 on these structures in Anglo-Saxon society.
99. !d. at II.
100. !d. at 11-33.
101. Herbert W. Titus, God's Revelation: Foundation for the Common Law, 4 REGENT U. L.
REV. ] (1994) (quoting CHING-HSUING Wu, FOUNTAIN OF JUSTICE: A STUDY IN THE NATURAL LAW
65 (1955)). See Banner, supra note 79, at 27 ( 1998) (arguing that the relation of common Jaw to
Chnstianity was not controlling in the development of case law). There was no uniform opinion at
the beginning of the nineteenth century as to whether the common law embodied Christiamty.
Jefferson resisted such ideas but a cadre of legal scholars contradicted Jefferson's opinions on this.
See the discussion on this controversy in Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 988-992.
102. Titus, supra note I 0 I, at I. See Titus' article for a look at the religious foundations of
the common law and how the Bible played a definitive part in the development and practice of the
common law.
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like Bracton and Coke were, probably no person had as much influence on
the Framers of our Declaration and Constitution than did Sir William
Blackstone.

3.

The influence of Sir William Blackstone, professor of common law
and a Christian

In the early 1980s three evangelical Christian historians wrote a book
in which they attempted to demonstrate that Christian thought had minor
importance to the founding of America. 103 Yet within their book they failed
even to mention Sir William Blackstone. Often those individuals most
commonly thought to have influenced the Founding Fathers of our nation
were of the radical enlightenment, such as Voltaire, Diderot, and
Helvetius, 104 but actually the conservative revolution of the Founders relied
much more on Locke for the formation of the new government and men
like Montesquieu and Blackstone for the structure of the new government.
Why was not Blackstone reviewed by the above writers as an
influence on the national legal system? He would seem to be a prime
candidate according to Lutz:
The prominence of Blackstone would come as a surprise to
many, and he is the prime candidate for the writer most likely
to be left out in any list of influential European thinkers. His
work is not readily available in inexpensive form, but like
Montesquieu he was cited frequently by all sides. A trenchant
reference to Blackstone could quickly end an argument. Such a
respected writer deserves a much closer look by those studying
American political thought. 105
Blackstone wrote his famous Commentaries on the Laws of England,
to a mixed audience. He offered lectures to those contemplating law as a
career. They were encouraged to attend his lectures to obtain a general
knowledge of common law before taking on the rigorous study in the Inns
of Court. 106 His lectures, then, were to explain broad principles for his
"young and largely ignorant audience." 107 D.A. Nolan argues that legal

103. MARK A. NOLL ET AL., The SEARCH FOR CHRISTIAN AMERICA (1983).
I 04. The Enlightenment may be divided into at least three periods: the first represented by men
like Montesquieu, Locke, and Pufendorf; the second by Voltaire, Diderot, and Helvetius; and the
third by Beccaria, Rousseau, Mably, and Raynal. See Donald S. Lutz, The Relative Influence of
European Writers on Late EiKhteenth-Century American Political ThouKht, 78 THE AMERICAN
POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 189, 190 (1984).
105. !d. at 195-196.
106. !.G. Doolittle, Sir William Blackstone and His Commentaries on the Laws of' England
(1765-9): A Biographical Approach, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDIES 99 (1983).
107. /d. at 99.
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education was the true significance of Blackstone rather than Blackstone
having influence on the founding of America or the political structures
afterward. 108 But how to separate Blackstone, the writer of the
Commentaries, from Blackstone, the teacher is difficult to imagine. As
Lord Coleridge once said, "One speaks and thinks of Blackstone as a
writer, not as a man." 109
Many American students returning from the Inns of Court in England
brought Blackstone back home with them. So popular did he become that
one thousand copies of his Commentaries were sold at ten pounds per set
before the first American edition was printed. Prepublication sales for the
first American edition were I 500. 110 Blackstone's Commentaries became
the chief, if not the only law book, in every lawyer's office in New
England. Daniel Webster read Blackstone before beginning the study of
law in 1804. James Kent, the famous American commentator and
professor of law, wrote that reading Blackstone at sixteen caused him to
want to become a lawyer. Abraham Lincoln, in 1835, came into possession
of the Commentaries and read them intensely.'" Blackstone's influence is
not only stamped on the dissemination of the common law to a broader
public, he is also important on the writing of the Declaration of
Independence.
4.

The influence of Christianity on the Declaration and Constitution

Scholars have long recognized the influence of the Bible 112 and the
Christian religion on the development of Western law, but many have
rejected the influence on the organic documents of our government,

108. Dennis R. Nolan. Sir William Blackstone and the New American Republic: A Study of
lmellectuallmpact. 51 NEW YORK U L. REV. 731 (1976). For a positive evaluation of Blackstone's
impact on Arne1ican politics. sec DAVID A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 169-190 (1938)
109. Doolittle, supra note 106, at 99.
110. PALL M. HAMLIN. LEGAL EDUCATION IN COLONIAL NEW YoRK 64-65 (1939), quoted in
Nolan, supra note I 08, at 737.
Ill. Nolan, supra note I 08, at 748, quotes Lincoln saying, "I never read anything which so
profoundly interested and thrilled me." (Citin!{ James M. Ogden, Lincoln's Early Impressions of the
Law in Indiana, 7 NOTRE DAME L REV .. 325, 325-29 (1932)).
112. For example, Rene Cassian and Charles Malik, important leaders in the development of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights saw these rights built on the Ten Commandments. JOHN
WARWICK MONTGOMERY, HUMAN RIGI!TS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, 275, n. 23 (1986) This was
confirmed when I attended the lnstitut International des Droits de /'Homme (International Institute
of Human Rights) at the University of Strasbourg in July, 1998. Two of the speakers - Professor
Boyle of the University of Essex and Professor M. Camille Kuyu Mwissa of the Catholic University
of Central Africa and University of Paris - specifically acknowledged the dependence of the
Declaration on Christian views, though Professor Boyle explained that resistance from Marxist
countries caused the Framers to make the language ambiguous; other examples exist in the
development of criminal law (see Witte and Arthur, supra note 80, at 433), tort law (see Cook,
supra note 81), and contract law (see Harold J. Berman, The Reli!{ious Sources ol General Contract
Law: An Historical Perspective I 03, 4 J. L. & RELIGION (1986)), to mention only a few
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namely the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the
United States. It is thought that the Declaration was written from purely an
enlightenment perspective relying on natural law and that the Constitution
is a totally secular document, intentionally so, to avoid the types of
religious divisions 113 that occurred in the lands from which they came.
We have already seen how John Locke was an important figure for the
War for Independence 114 but after this period his writings gained little
hearing. 115 The people were moving to the matter of how to structure this
new government that began in 1776. Other sources were used in the
political rhetoric of the day. 116 The most quoted book of the period from
1760-1805 in the political writings of the day was the book of
Deuteronomy (the law book), in the Bible, accounting for thirty-four
percent of all the quotes. 117 The person, after Montesquieu, who was most
quoted in the era immediately before and after the drafting of the
Constitution was Blackstone 118 and almost as much as Locke during the
period leading up to the Declaration. 119
Several key statements of the Declaration may reflect Blackstonian
thought. The phrase "Jaws of nature and of nature's God" 120 particularly
reminds one of Blackstone's emphasis on this two-fold view of law.
Following Burlamaqui and Pufendorf. Blackstone saw nature as having
certain laws established by God which expressed the will of God and were
superior to any contrary law made by men: 121

113. See Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 961-62.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 83-83.
115. Lutz, supra note 104, at 192-193.
116. See infra APPENDIX for graphs of the thinkers and sources quoted during the period of
1760-1805.
117 Lutz, supra note l 04, says:
Anyone familiar with the literature will know that most of these citations come from
sermons reprinted as pamphlets; hundreds of sermons were repnnted during the era,
amounting to at least l 0% of all pamphlets published. These reprinted sermons accounted
for almost three-fourths of the biblical citations, making this nonsermon source of biblical
citations roughly as important as the Classical or Common Law categories.
/d. at 192.
118. D.S Lutz and C.S. Hyneman reviewed 15,000 items in the political writings between
1760-1805, reading closely 2,200 with explicitly political content. Included were all books, pamphlets,
newspaper articles, and monographs printed for public consumption. Lutz, supra note l 04, at 191;
see also AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805 (Charles S. Hyneman
and Donald S. Lutz eds., 1983).
119. He is quoted more than two and one-half times that of Locke (see APPENDIX for chart).
Probably this is because his writings are strong on governmental process, operation, and interaction
of institutions.
120. The Declaration of Independence para. l (U.S. 1776).
121. This latter idea has been held by Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Samuel Rutherford in Lex
Rex, and adopted by Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. King cites Aquinas saying, "An unjust law is a
human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law." MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE
CAN'T WAIT 85 (1964). Also he writes, "All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation
distorts the soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense of inferiority .
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[W]hen the Supreme Being formed the universe, and created
matter out of nothing, he impressed certain principles upon
that matter, from which it can never depart, and without
which it would cease to be. When he put that matter into
motion, he established certain laws of motion, to which all
moveable bodies must conform. 122

Consequent to this initial postulate of Blackstone, he continues:
Man, considered as a creature, must necessarily be subject to
the laws of his Creator, for he is entirely a dependent
being .... And, consequently, as man depends absolutely upon
his Maker for everything, it is necessary that he should in all
points conform to his Maker's will.
This will of his Maker is called the law of Nature. For as
God, when he created matter, and endued it with a principle of
mobility, established certain rules for the perpetual direction
of that motion; so, when he created man, and endued him with
free-will to conduct himself in all parts of life, he laid down
certain immutable laws of human nature .... These are the
eternal, immutable laws of good and evil. 123

Since God's laws in nature are preeminent over human laws, human
laws are invalid when in conflict with them:
This law of nature being coeval with mankind, and
dictated by God himself, is of course superior in obligation to
any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and
at all times: no human laws are of any validity if contrary to
this; and such of them as are valid derive all their force and all
their authority mediately or immediately, from this original. 124

Blackstone did not only consider the "laws of nature" as a standard of
law for human laws to conform, he viewed the divine law, the Holy
Scriptures as even a clearer standard:
[I]f our reason were always, as in our first ancestor [Adam]
before his transgression, clear and perfect, unruffled by

segregation is not only politically, economically, and sociologically unsound, it is morally wrong and
sinful." !d. at 85. Ironically, "[t]he late Austrian legal theorist Hans Kelsen stated that an unjust law
is a contradiction in terms. because it is law itself that sets the standard for what is just. Indeed,
although Kelsen was Jewish, the anti-Semite Hitler availed himself of Kelsen' s arguments in setting
up his totalitarian system." Brown, supra note 62, at 123.
122. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 38-39.
123. !d. at 39.
124. !d. at 41.
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passions, unclouded by prejudice, unimpaired by disease or
intemperance, the task would be pleasant and easy; we should
need no other guide but this [i.e., the law of nature]. But every
man now finds the contrary in his own experience; that his
reason is corrupt, and his understanding full of ignorance and
error.
This has given manifold occasion for the benign
interposition of divine providence; which, in compassion to the
frailty, the imperfection, and the blindness of human reason,
hath been pleased ... to discover and enforce its laws by an
immediate and direct revelation. The doctrines thus delivered
we call the revealed or divine law, and they are to be found
only in the holy scriptures . . . . These precepts [the ones
written in the holy Scriptures] ... , when revealed, are found
on comparison to be really a part of the original law of nature,
as they tend in all their consequences to man's felicity. But we
are not from thence to conclude that the knowledge of these
truths was attainable by reason, in its present corrupted state;
since we find that, until they were revealed [in writing], they
were hid from the wisdom of the ages. As then the moral
precepts of this law are indeed of the same original with those
of the law of nature, so their intrinsic obligation is of equal
strength and perpetuity .125

Titus explains the practical outworking of Blackstone's comments:
In other words, God's putting in written form, "Thou shalt not
murder" (Ex. 20:13) did not make murder wrong, but His
putting the rule in writing revealed more effectively to fallen
people the original law protecting the sanctity of human life
that God had placed and revealed in the created order from
the beginning. Murder was wrong, therefore, because it was
contrary to the nature of people and to the very nature of
God's creation. 126

How did Blackstone view the disobedience to a human law that came
into conflict with God's law in nature or Scripture? He walked in the train
of many before him: "Nay, if any human law should allow or injoin us to
commit it [an act contrary to divine or natural law], we are bound to
transgress that human law, or else we must offend both the natural and the

125. /d. at 41-42, quoted in Herbert W. Titus, God's Revelation: Foundation for the Common
Law, in THE CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAW: CHRISTIANITY'S IMPACT ON AMERICA'S FOUNDING
DOCUMENTS AND FUTURE DIRECTION 19-20 (H. Wayne House ed., 1998).
126. Titus, supra note 125, at 20.
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divine." 127 One can readily see that young men reading Blackstone,
coupled with the thinking of Locke, could easily be led to confront
England who seemed to place itself above just laws in dealing with the
colonies.
Blackstone may not be the only Christian influence on the Declaration.
According to Gary Amos, the Declaration is not merely a theistic
document, that few could dispute, but is distinctly Christian in nature:
"When we examine the terminology, argument, and logical structure of the
Declaration, we find them to be consistent with the Bible and Christian
teaching." 128 This is in stark contrast to the pervasive influence of Carl
Becker, whose ideas on the primary enlightenment influence on the
Declaration has held sway for seventy years. 129 I am compelled by the
arguments of Amos that the primary influence on the Declaration was
Christian in nature, but certainly not devoid of those enlightenment
influences of men like Locke whose enlightenment thinking was tempered
(the reason I have called it conservative above) with the Christian
worldview and biblical guidance. This is notwithstanding the contribution
to the Declaration by Jefferson. But we must bear in mind that a committee
wrote the Declaration, not Jefferson alone, and that the Declaration is not a
person letter of Jefferson to King George; it is a statement from the
colonists, 130 and written with that in mind, who were almost entirely
Christian, and written to the King and England, who also were Christian.
Edward Humphrey's listing of Christian terminology is convincing
that the Declaration and other documents of the time reflecting
Protestantism.
The multiplicity of references to the Deity in the
Declaration reflects similar invocations in the proclamations
and other state papers of the Continental Congress. These
unabashedly exhibited a belief in Trinitarian Protestantism.
Congress continually invoked, as sanction for its acts, the
name of "God," "Almighty God," "Nature's God," "God of
Armies," "Lord of Hosts," "His Goodness," "God's

127. BLACKSTONE, supra note 122 at 40.
128. GARY AMOS, DEFENDING THE DECLARATION: How THE BIBLE AND CHRISTIANITY
INFLUENCED THE WRITING OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 128 (1989). See also Gary Amos.
The Philosophical and Biblical Perspectives That Shaped the Declaration of Independence, in TilE
CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAw 49-82. See discussion of the Christian nature of the Declaration in
Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 969.
129. See BECKER, supra note 83.
130. Lutz, supra note 84, at 36. "Contrary to popular belief today, Jefferson did not write the
Declaration of Independence de novo. As Jefferson himself later explained, he pieced it together from
the political literature of his time to 'reflect the American mind.' " !d. al n. 18 (alluding to
Jefferson's Jetter to Henry Lee on May 8, 1825, 10 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 343 (P
Leicester Ford ed. I 899)).
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Superintending
Providence,"
"Providence
of
God,"
"Providence,"
"Supreme
and
Universal
Providence,"
"Overruling Providence of God," "Creator of All," "Indulgent
Creator," "Great Governor of the World," "The Divinity,"
"Supreme Disposer of All Events," "Holy Ghost," "Jesus
Christ," "Christian Religion," "Free Protestant Colonies," and
other expressions of devout Christian Protestantism. 1.31

The Constitution, as well, is a document that reflects a Christian
worldview. Let me be clear, the Constitution is a federal document, first of
all, seeking to provide a structure to a government begun with the
Declaration, and limiting the power of the government in deference to
individual state governments. 132 It is not a theological document or creed,
so largely absent of such terminology. 133 At the same time it is not an antiChristian document either. 134 One would be surprised to find, in a
document like the Constitution, terms as found in the Declaration, but
there are internal signs of the influence of Christian ideas in the
Constitution that many in the early days of the Republic sought to
demonstrate. 135 For my purpose, it is sufficient to mention but a few
examples of Christian influence to illustrate that Christianity and the
federal government are not intended to be at opposite poles or separated by
a high and impenetrable wall. 136
Before the drafting and passage of the First Amendment guaranteeing
"free exercise" of religion, the Constitution had already contained
provisions for such a doctrine. The Constitution provides in Article VI that
"no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or

131
EDWARD FRANK HUMPHREY, NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN AMERICA, 1774-1789 407
(1924 ), quoted in Leo Pfeffer, The Deity in American Constitutional Histmy, 23 J. CHURCH & STATE
215. 217 (1981).
132. Approximately half of the delegates to the federal convention of 1787 had been
representatives at their state conventions where the documents were replete with religious references.
In the federal (not national) constitution, such references are largely, though not totally omitted, since
none really believed that the federal government should be involved in furtherance of religion, leaving
this alone for the state to determine. David E. Maas, The Philosophical and Theological Roots of
the Religious Roots of the Religious Clause in LIBERTY AND LAW: AMERICAN LIFE AND THOUGHT !,
7 (Ronald A. Wells & Thomas A. Askew eds., 1987).
133. For a discussion of reasons why some believe statements regarding God and the Christian
religion are omitted from the Constitution, see Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 955-964.
134. For the various type of explicit and implicit references to God and the Christian religion
m the Constitution, see id. at 964-994.
135. For example, Knicely, at supra note 25, at 265, indicates the position of Jasper Adams,
strong advocate for the Christian nature of the Constitution:
The failure to express more sympathy to religion in the Constitution, however, was in
Adam's view by design, just as the Constitution left unstated other fundamental truths,
such as the inalienable rights of the people, the political sovereignty of the people, and
the right of the people to resist and abolish tyranny. !d.
136. See generally JOHN EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION ( 1987).
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public Trust under the United States." 137 Such a statement was not denying
religious tests in the various states, however, for
[m]any in the founding generation supported a federal test ban
because they valued religious tests required under state laws,
and they feared a federal test might displace existing state test
oaths and religious establishments. Even among the most
ardent proponents of Article VI, few denied the advantage of
placing devout Christians in public office." 138

A second provision relating to oaths was the matter of taking oaths.
Certain Christians would not take oaths, for religious reasons, such as the
Quakers, so the authors deferred to them in the writing of the document by
adding "affirmation." Oaths in the eighteenth century carried religious
import, a solemn statement before the Supreme Being and affirmation
carried the same idea. 139 Michael McConnell properly observes that these
two elements - no religious tests and the affirmation exception to the
taking of oaths - "reflect a spirit and purpose similar to that of the (First
Amendment's) free exercise clause." 140 Another minor implicit indication
of the Framers concession of Christianity in the Constitution is providing
for a Sunday exception in the signing of legislation. 141
Two explicit examples of Christian ideas in the Constitution are the
mention of the "year of our Lord" in Article VII, and the recognition of the
Declaration as the proper preamble to the Constitution. Regarding Article
VII, there is no question that this dating method was the common method
in the Christian west and was used regularly on official documents. Unlike
the French calendar, which began a new calendar with the revolution, 142
the colonists maintained association with their Christian past. Such
continuance, though significant to many nineteenth commentators, 143 gives
but a small benefit to the Christian nature of the Constitution. More
significant. in my opinion is the argument that the Declaration is the
preamble to the Constitution, so that the documents, though different in
nature, serve as one organic whole.

I 37. For the meaning of the oath and religious test in the Constitution see Maas, supra note
132. at 1-23.
138. Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 951.
139. See 1d. at 981-986.
140. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding o{ Free exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1473 (1990), quoted in Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 983.
141. See Dreisbach, supra note 55 at 974-75.
142. !d. at 965-96.
143. !d. at 966.

203]

A TALE OF TWO KINGDOMS

239

The Declaration of Independence, an unarguably theistic, if not
Christian document, may be understood as the preamble to the
Constitution. As Donald Lutz says,
After approving the Declaration, the Continental Congress turned to
writing a national constitution. The Articles of Confederation that
resulted proved defective in important respects. As a result, the new
Constitution of 1787 replaced the Articles. The Declaration, however,
continued to stand as the preface to the American national compact. The
Constitution begins, "We the people of the United States, in order to
create a more perfect union." The people already exist, and exist in a
political union. This can be only if there is a first part to a compact of
which the Constitution is the second part. There is no document that can
be pointed to as fulfilling such a role other than the Declaration of
Independence. To say that we live under a national compact of which the
Declaration is the first part may sound a bit strange at first, but it would
be stranger still to have begun our national bicentennial in 1976 if the
Declaration of Independence was not part of our national founding. 144

Another line of argument that demonstrates the relationship between
these two documents is found in the Constitution itself. The Constitution,
in several places, connects the founding of the government with the
Declaration of the Independence, and upon which its relies for its
philosophical foundation.
The first line of evidence, however, is from the Declaration itself. The
heading to the Declaration is "The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen
United States of America." 145 The document, then, portends to come from
the "one people" of the United States of America, though of course the
manner in which the states will relate to each other is uncertain until after
the ratification of the Constitution in 1791. They wanted the world to
know that they were a new nation, rightly independent of England.
Second, the Declaration toward the end concludes, "We, therefore, the
representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress,
assembled." 146
The Constitution written in 1787 was "for" the nation already formed
in 1776. Further evidence that this was the way the Framers of the
Constitution viewed the situation is found within the Constitution itself. 147

144. Lutz, supra note 84, at 37. See also Dennis J. Mahoney, The Declaration of independence
as a Constitutional Document, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 54. 65
(Leonard W Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney eds., 1987) (arguing that the Declaration of Independence
"is the real preamble to the Constitution") (cited in Dreisbach, supra note 55, at 184)
145. The Declaration of Independence, heading (U.S. 1776).
146. The Declaration of Independence, para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
147. I am indebted for some of these observations to an unpublished paper by Cannada.
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Article I, §2(2), requires that the representatives must have been "seven
years a citizen of the United States" 148 before holding office. Such a
requirement presupposed the existence of the nation in order for the House
of Representatives to convene in 1789. A similar example is found
regarding senators in Article I, §3(3) but "nine years a citizen of the
United States .... " 149 Unless the government already existed, they would
need to wait nine years to meet after 1789. One more qualification clause
is used with similar import, that of President. The pertinent clause reads
(Art. II, § 1(5)), "No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the
United States, at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the office of President ... and been fourteen years a resident
within the United States." 15° Cannada elucidates on this:
Clearly, this provision recognizes that there could a
"natural born citizen" at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution and thus "citizenship" did exist prior to the time
of the adoption of the Constitution. It is also interesting to
note that the "residence" requirement went even beyond the
date of the Declaration and that the term "resident" was used
rather than the term "Citizen". There was no such thing as a
Citizen until the nation was established and that was done by
the adoption of the Declaration. 151

The last indication of the existence of the United States from the time
of the Declaration is found at the very end of the Constitution. It
concludes, "DONE in convention by the unanimous consent of the states
present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven and of the Independence of the
United States of America the twelfth." The unanimous consent was from
"states present" at the Declaration.
The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution worked
together to provide the soul and the body of the law for the proper ordering
of society, maintaining morality and civility for the majority of the nation's
governmental history. These documents should not be separated. The
Declaration sets forth the principles upon which the government of the
nation was to be founded, whereas the Constitution establishes the civil
powers to accomplish the principles of the Declaration. In view of this, the
Constitution cannot be viewed as absent the theological ideas that
permeate the Declaration. This perspective gives meaning to the words of

Inalienable RiRhts and the
148. U.S. Const. art.
149. U.S. Const. art.
150. U.S Const. art.
151. Cannada, supra

Declaration of" Independence 6-7 (1992).
I, §2(2).
I, §3(3).
II, §1(5).
note 147, at 6.
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John Quincy Adams who said, "The highest glory of the American
Revolution was this; it connected in one indissoluble bond the principles
of civil government with the principles of Christianity" 152 and "From the
day of the Declaration ... they (the American people) were bound by the
laws of God, which they all, and by the laws of The Gospel, which they
nearly all, acknowledge as the rules of their conduct." 153
One last example puts the coup d'grace on this argument. Cannada
illustrates:
[I]t is significant that as states were subsequently admitted
into the Union the statutes admitting such admission provided
that they would be admitted with "equal footing" or to the
"same footing" as the original states. In fact, the admission
statutes for thirteen states, including the states of Alaska in
1958 and of Hawaii in 1959, contained language such as that
their respective Constitutions "shall be republican in form ...
and not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States
and the principles of the Declaration of Independence." Thus
we have Congress, as late as 1959, protecting the structure of
the government of this nation .... 154

Accordingly, each state in the union, with the exception of Oregon,
specifically make reference to either Almighty God, the Supreme Ruler of
the Universe, God, Creator, or Supreme Being, being consistent with the
Declaration, upon whom the principles of the Declaration rely. 155
5.

The Reformation doctrine of the two kingdoms

The Founders of the United States shared many theological points in
common with the Reformers that gave rise to the Protestant Reformation.
Views of God, the sinfulness of man, kinds of church government, and the
use of covenant, among others, were shared by this generally homogenous
group of men. They were largely Calvinists, influenced by some
enlightenment thinking, and well versed in the history, politics, and
philosophy of the past. 156
Rather than entering into these matters, I would like to suggest one
area in which the Reformation influenced the nature of church and state,

I 52. THORNTON, supra note 2, quoted in FEDERER, supra note 2, at I 8.
153. !d.
154. Cannada, supra note 147, at 7.
155. For example, California, the state of my citizenship has in its preamble, "We, the People
of the State of California, grateful to Almighty God for our freedom, in order to secure and
perpetuate its blessings, do establish this Constitution." CALIFORNIA CONST. preamble (amend. Nov.
5. 1996)
156. See EIDSMOE, supra note 136, at 17-38.
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which I believe, had major impact on the formation of the American
system of government: the doctrine of the two kingdoms.
The doctrine of the two kingdoms is first seen in the history of the
kingdom of Israel. Though Israel is commonly thought of as a theocracy
(the direct rule of God) in reality it appears to be more like a constitutional
monarchy. The king himself was under the covenant that Yahweh made
with Israel (Ex. 19), and the king, unlike the "ruler cults" of the ancient
world 157 could not legally enter into the functions of the cultus. The
clearest example of this prohibition is found in the confrontation between
Samuel and Israel's first king, Saul. Samuel, the prophet-priest of Yahweh,
took longer to come to Gilgal to offer a sacrifice than Saul thought
advisable so he offered the sacrifice himself. Due to this Yahweh cut Saul
and his line from the kingship (I Sam 13). Another example is King
Uzziah who attempted to bum incense at the altar of God. Because of this
Yahweh inflicted him with leprosy which remained with him the rest of his
life (2 Chron. 26:16-21). One might say that Yahweh created a wall of
separation between the religious cultus of Israel and the state, though it
was never intended to be a separation of Yahweh and state.
The doctrine of separate kingdoms was first explicated by Jesus Christ.
When he was approached by certain Jewish leaders regarding whether one
should pay taxes to Caesar or not (Luke 20:22) he uttered the famous
statement: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the
things that are God's" (Luke 20:25). Jesus thereby acknowledged that the
state had legitimacy and a jurisdiction, though all things belong to God.
Lord Acton speaks to these words of Christ:
When Christ said "Render unto Caesar the things that are
Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's," He gave to
the State a legitimacy it had never before enjoyed, and set
bounds to it that had never yet been acknowledged. And He
not only delivered the precept but He also forged the
instrument to execute it. To limit the power of the State ceased
to be the hope of patient, ineffectual philosophers and became
the perpetual charge of a universal church. 158

The other major New Testament presentation of the two kingdoms is
found in the letter of the apostle Paul to the Romans, though the emphasis
there is on the kingdom of the left (to use Luther's designation):
Let every soul be subject to the governing authorities. For
there is no authority except from God, and the authorities that

157.
158.

See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
EIDSMOE. supra note 17, at Ill (quotinK Gertrude Hirnrnelfarh 45 ( 1955))
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exist are appointed by God. Therefore whoever resists the
authority resists the ordinance of God, and those who resist
will bring judgment on themselves. For rulers are not a terror
to good works, but to evil. Do you want to be unafraid of the
authority? Do what is good, and you will have praise from the
same. For he is God's minister to you for good. But if you do
evil, be afraid; for he does not bear the sword in vain; for he is
God's minister, an avenger to execute wrath on him who
practices evil. 159

The apostle indicates that the power of the state is not by human
design but by divine, to the point that Christians were to obey the civil
ruler, at Paul's time the Roman emperor Nero, 160 though this obedience
was not absolute, 16 I articulated first by the apostle Peter on the loyalties of
the Christian when it seeks to place the duty of the Christian to God over
against that of the state. 162
All of these biblical texts set forth the teachings that the powers of the
state are legitimate, since ordained by God, but that they are limited in
scope to those areas instituted by God and separate from the duties
imposed by God on the religious community and religious individual.
Michael McConnell explains the importance of this theological construct:
While theological in its origin, the two-kingdoms idea lent
powerful support to a more general liberal theory of
government, because once the government could be limited in
one respect, it could be limited in others. The state could no
longer be understood as omnicompetent. This idea provided
probably the most important counterweight to the common
Enlightenment belief that the best form of government was
enlightened despotism. It can be argued that of the two great
intellectual upheavals of the early modern period, the
Enlightenment and the Protestant Reformation, the latter was
the more significant for the advance of political liberty. Of
course, much blood was spilled for conscience - not least by
Protestants - before these implications of Protestant doctrine
became apparent and ultimately dominant." 163

159.
160.

Romans 13:1-4 (NKJV)
See R.C SPROUL, The Biblical View o{ Subnussion to Constituted Authority, in

THE

CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAW 126-138 (H WAYNE HOUSE ed., 1998)

161. See H. WAYNE HOUSE, The Christian's Duty o{ Civtl Disobedience to the Government:
Contemporary StruJ?gfes Between Christians and the State, m THE CHRISTIAN AND AMERICAN LAW
139-174 (H. WAYNE HOUSE ed, 1998).
162. See Acts 4:19.
163. McConnell, supra note 39, at 168-169. McConnell likewise notes that "The two-kingdoms
view of competing authorities is at the heart of our First Amendment." !d. at 169.
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Though Christians have generally held to a two-kingdoms doctrine
from the initiation of the church and the teaching we have observed from
the Scriptures, there has been disagreement on how this doctrine should be
understood and what jurisdiction the church and state held in respect to
each other.
Catholic theologians have generally recognized a difference between
the church and the state- the two kingdoms (to use Luther's terminology)
- but have usually viewed the church as the greater of the two. 164 The
reasoning for the church as greater than the state largely rests on the
perspective of Augustine. He argued for the superiority of the church since
it is etemal and the state temporal, and because the church must answer to
God for the conduct of the state. The two kingdoms, or two swords,
perspective was given by Pope Boniface VII in his papal bull, Unam
Sanctum, in A. D. 1304:
We are told by the word of the gospel that in this His fold
there are two swords, - a spiritual, namely, and a temporal.
For when the apostles said "Behold here are two swords" when, namely, the apostles were speaking in the church- the
Lord did not reply that this was too much, but enough. Surely
he who denies that the temporal sword is in the power of Peter
wrongly interprets the word of the Lord when He says: "Put up
thy sword in its scabbard." Both swords, the spiritual and the
material, therefore, are in the power of the church; the one,
indeed, to be wielded for the church, the other by the church;
the one by the hand of the priest, the other by the hand of
kings and knights, but at the will and sufferance of the priest.
One sword, moreover, ought to be under the other, and the
temporal authority to be subjected to the spiritual. For when
the apostle says "there is no power but of God, and the powers
that are of God are ordained," they would not be ordained
unless sword were under sword and the lesser one, as it were,
were led by the other to great deed. 165

In contrast to the Roman Catholic view, Luther saw the church and
state to be neither superior nor inferior to the other, but both as being
created by God to different purposes. He viewed the state as being
responsible to restrain evil. Believers belong to both kingdoms, the church

164. This section on the diflerent theories of the Roman Catholic, Lutheran. Cah·inist. and
Anabaptist perspectives on the relation of church and state is largely drawn from my discussion in
H. WAYNE HOUSE, CIIRISTIAI\ MINISTRIES AND THE LAW: WHAT CHURCH AND PARA-CilliRCH
LEADERS SHOULD KNOW 34-37 (1992).
165. EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 112 (quoting Pope Boniface VIII, Unum Sanctum, 1304 A.D.
printed in E. F HENDERSON, SELECT HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS OF THE MIDDLE AGES 43)-37 ( 196)))
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and the state, and have responsibilities to each. Luther believed that
believers relate to the first kingdom, the church, by faith, and to the second
kingdom, the state, by reason. 166
Luther, unlike Calvin, did not believe that Christians had the right to
use the state to promote Christianity. Christians who were in government
should use Christian principles in government only inasmuch as the
principles could also be justified by reason. Even a prudent but evil ruler is
to be preferred to an imprudent but virtuous ruler, since the latter may
bring ruin to the state while the former at least may resist evil. 167
Calvin believed that the state's authority came from God and that this
authority came directly from God and not through the church, unlike
Roman Catholics. He accepted the legitimate separations of these spheres:
For the Church has no power of the sword to punish or
coerce, no authority to compel, no prisons, fines, or other
punishments like those inflicted by civil magistrates. Besides,
the object of this power is not that he who has transgressed
may be punished against his will, but that he may profess his
repentance by a voluntary submission to chastisement. 168

Even though Calvin had no difficulty with the government
maintaining the official public church, he did believe in limiting
government's activity in reference to religion. This recognition between
the separate jurisdictions of the church and the state caused Calvin to
express a view strikingly similar to that found in the First Amendment
Establishment Clause:
Nor let anyone think it strange that I now refer to human
polity the change of the due maintenance of religion which I
may appear to have placed beyond the jurisdiction of men. For
I do not allow men to make laws respecting religion and the
worship of God now, any more than I did before: though I
approve of civil government which provides that the true
religion which is contained in the law of God be not violated,
and polluted by public blasphemies with impunity. 169

166. Luther has often been viewed as placing reason and faith at opposite poles. See House,
for a discussion of how Luther used the term ratio. House, Luther's View of Apologetics, 7
CONCORDIA THEOLOGICAL J. 65 ( 1981 ).
167 Luther is purported to have said that he would rather have a "competent Turk rule than
an incompetent Christian." (quoted in DAVID W. HALL, SAVIOR OR SERVANT? PUTTING GOVERNMENT
IN ITS PLACE 210 (1996)).
168. JOHN CALVIN, I INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 116, quoted in PHILIP KURLAND
AND RALPH LERNER, 5 THE FOUNDER'S CONSTITUTION 44 (1987) [hereinafter FOUNDER'S].
169. Fm•NDER'S, supra note 168, at 44.
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It may very well be that the framers picked up Calvin's words "laws
respecting religion", since his thinking and writings were ever present
among the predominant Calvinist colonists. These colonists also sought to
extend "freedom of conscience," believing that every person should
worship God "according to his own conscience." 170
This view of Calvin had already found a firm footing in England. King
James II saw a need for toleration of religious sects, as evidenced in his
letter to Thomas Dongan in 1682, where he used the phrase, "free
exercise" of religion: 171
You shall permit all persons of what religion soever quietly
to inhabit within your government without giving them any
disturbance or disquiet whatsoever for or by reasons of their
differing opinions in matters of Religion, provided they give no
disturbance to ye public peace, nor do molest or disquiet others
in ye free Exercise of their Religion. 172

A couple of examples in the early colonies of America provide further
evidence that the doctrine of the two kingdoms had found root, with its
implications of religious freedom. In a charter that Pennsylvania agreed
upon with England in 1682 a reciprocal duty of free exercise was
guaranteed:
persons that hold themselves obliged in conscience to live
peaceable and justly in Civil Society [would] in no ways be
molested or prejudiced for their religious persuasion or
practice, in matters of faith and worship, nor shall they be
compelled at any time, to frequent or maintain any religious
worship, place or ministry whatever. m

Even with this liberality toward religious conscience, though, William
Penn, in that charter, required one common element, "faith in Jesus
Christ." 174
Massachusetts Christians also followed the thinking of John Calvin, at
least in regards to other Christians being in their midst: "If any people of
other nations professing the true Christian Religion shall flee to us from
the Tyranny or oppression of their persecutors or from famine, wars or the
like necessary and compulsory cause, they shall he entertained and

170. !d.
171. FouNDER's supra note 168, at 52 (quotinK King James II Instructions to Governor
Thomas Dungan).
172. !d.
173. !d. (quotinK Pennsylvania Charter Of Liberty)
174. !d.
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succored amongst us, according to that power and prudence, god shall
give us." 175 The Rhode Island Baptist Roger Williams expanded this idea
to argue that God did not demand uniformity in any civil state 176 and that
nations should not pursue holy wars for Christianity but evangelize with
the sword of the Spirit:
It is the will and command of God, that since the coming of
his Son the Lord Jesus, a permission of the most Paganish,
Jewish, Turkish, or anti-Christian consciences and worship be
granted to all man, in all nations and countries; and they are
only to be fought against with that sword which is in soulmatters able to conquer, to wit; the sword of the Spirit-the
Word ofGod. 177

The Christian is a citizen of both kingdoms, being under the authority
of both the state and the church. The state's authority, however, is limited
to the areas of authority given to it by God. If the state steps beyond its
authority, its acts are without legitimacy and are lawless, to which
authority believers owe no duty and should resist. These Calvinistic ideas
generally set well with the purposes of the late 18th century colonists due
to the thinking of Calvin being so pervasive in the thinking of most of the
churches, and consequently the citizens. 178
One other perspective on the relationship of church and state existed in
the eighteenth century and before, the Anabaptist view. I will not be
discussing it at any length and consider it but a minor significance for the
present study. The Anabaptists (and some of their descendants) believed
that the state was part of the evil world system ruled by Satan and thus
Christians were to do all possible to remove themselves from it and its
affairs. Thus Christians were not to vote, hold public office, serve in the
armed forces, or be involved in government in any other way. Christians,
generally, were to obey the state but the state had no real authority over
Christians, nor did the church have any authority over unbelievers.
Though the doctrine of two kingdoms was held differently by various
Christian traditions- the perspective of Calvin probably was predominant
in the New England colonies since virtually all the churches were
Calvinistic in their views - the impact of the two kingdoms was ideally
suited to the new form of government intended by the Framers. They
desired a state limited in power and unable to reach the institutional

175. FOUNDER'S, supra note 168, at 47 (quotin!( Body of Liberties of the Massachusetts Colony
in New England).
176. FOlrNDER • s, supra note 168, at 48 (quoting Roger Williams, The Bloody Tcnent of
Persecution for Cause of Conscience).
177. /d.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 112-55.
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church. They did not want a Church of New England. Unfortunately, as
subsequent analysis will demonstrate, the relationship between church and
state, and between religious values and beliefs and the state have become
more complicated in this century.
III. CAUGHT IN THE MIRE: CAN THE SUPREME COURT EXTRICATE ITSELF
FROM ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONFUSION?

A. A Befuddled Court Presses on with Judicial Confidence but not with
Judiciousness
There is unprecedented confusion in the courts today regarding the
interpretation and application of the religion clauses of the First
Amendment to the Constitution. The First Amendment seems
straightforward but has engendered considerable debate. The amendment
reads simply, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. " 179
Until the Everson 180 decision of 1947 the courts gave little
consideration to the establishment prong and instead dealt with certain free
exercise claims of minority religious groups that had arisen on American
soil. 181 The general view of the courts of this land was that the first part of
the amendment was forbidding Congress, the only law making body of the
federal government, from establishing a national religion or preferring one
religious group or religious tenets over other groups or doctrines. This
seems to have been the understanding of those that actually wrote and
adopted this amendment based on the debates and revisions that occurred
in the summer and early fall of 1787. 182

179. U.S CONST. amend. I.
180. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 US I (1947).
181. The Mormon polygamy cases concerned religious practices that were viewed as being
the tenets of mainline Christian beliefs (Reynolds v. United States, 98 US 145 (1878); Late
Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S I (1890);
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S 333 ( 1890)). whereas the Jehovah's Witnesses came under fire in several
decisions over a variety of religious freedom issues (Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 ( 1940);
Jobin v. Opelika, 316 U.S 584 (1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S 105 (1943); Minersville
School District v. Gobitis 310 US. 586 (!940); West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S 158 (1944))
182. See rehearsal of history by the Court in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 US
457, 465-471 (1892)
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Seeing Through a Glass Darkly: How the Courts Have Interpreted
the Establishment Clause
"[T}heir legislature should 'make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church &
State." 183
Thomas Jefferson
"I must admit, moreover, that it may not be easy, in every
case, to trace the line of separation, between the right of
Religion & the Civil authority, with such distinctness, as to
avoid collisions & doubts on unessential points." 184
James Madison
But when a man's fancy gets astride on his reason, when
imagination is at cuffs with the senses, and common
understanding, as well as common sense, is kicked out of
doors, the first proselyte he makes is himself; and when that is
once compassed, the difficulty is not so great in bringing over
others. 185
Jonathan Swift

How then did we get to the current constitutional malaise we observe
today? In 194 7, the United States Supreme Court embarked on a course
that would prove both controversial and, at times, paradoxical when it
decided the seminal Everson v. Board of Education case. 180 The case
purported to be consistent with the Framer's understanding of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment 187 and the Court, for the first
time in its history, found the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
to be applicable to state action through the Fourteenth Amendment. 188

183. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and
Stephen S. Nelson, a committee of the Danbury Baptist association in the state of Connecticut, I
January 1802, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series
I. Box 89, 2 December 1801-1 January 1802; Presidential Papers Microfilm, Thomas Jefferson
Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress), Series I, Reel 25, 15 November 1801-31 March
1802, quoted in Dreisbach, supra note 17, at I; (emphasis added).
184. DANIEL DREISBACII, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 157 (quoting
Madison).
185. JONATHAN SWIFr, A Tale of a Tub, in I THE NORTON ANTHOLOGY Of ENGLISH
LITERATURE (Abrams et a!., eds. 1979).
186. 330 U.S. I (1947).
187. !d. at II.
188. "The First Amendment, as made applicable by the Fourteenth, commands that a 'state
shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof".
/d. at 8. Although this is the first instance the Court makes the establishment clause applicable, it
is not the first case in which the Court deals with an establishment issue. See Bradfield v. Roberts,
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Since this case, many have criticized, 189 and others praised,190 the Court's
application of the Establishment Clause to state action.
Whether initially legitimate or not, 191 the incorporation of the First
Amendment via the Fourteenth IS now a permanent fixture of
Constitutional law. However, now that the First Amendment
Establishment Clause is part of the landscape, the question becomes one of
its meaning and significance to claims brought under the clause; 192
specifically, the proper model or test which ought to be used in
Establishment Clause adjudication.
In this portion of the article, I will first endeavor to establish the
proper meaning of the Establishment Clause by examining the text itself,
the Founder's intention, as informed by the study of history, and the
historical precedent prior to Everson, insofar as practicable. 193 Second, I
will examine Supreme Court decisions for both consistency with the
meaning established in the preceding argument of this section and provide
insight into a possible test for the Establishment Clause. Third, I will
examine alternative models which have been suggested for examining the

175 U S 291 ( 1899) (finding that money given through a federal appropriations act to construct
buildings on a hospital grounds in the District of Columbia, owned by Sisters of Charity, did not
violate the First Amendment since the purposes of the hospital were non-sectarian in nature); Rueben
Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (finding that moneys appropriated under ;1 trust fund
established by Congress for the education of members of the Sioux tribe by the Bureau of Catholic
Missions did not violate recent Congressional statutes prohibiting the use of congressional funds
among the Indian tribes for sectarian purposes); and Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education.
281 U S 370 ( 1930) (upholding a Louisiana statute which provided for the purchase of books for
children attending parochial school against a challenge that the Louisiana statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by constituting a taking of private property for a private purpose).
189. See CORD, supra note 17, at 109-133; WILLIAM H. MARNELL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA l8o-189 (1964); MARK DE WOLFE HOWE, THE
GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
22 (1965); L ALLEN SMITH, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 298-300 ( 1972); G.
BRADLEY. CH!IRCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA (!987); and MICHAEL J. MALBIN, RELIGIO~
AND POLITICS; TilE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1978).
190. A. A. STOKES & LEO. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 130-131
(1964); LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 131-133 (1967); LEONARD W. LEVY, THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 187-189 (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMER'S CONSTITUTION 2 (1988); and ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
19!. For a critique of the incorporation doctrine, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE
JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); and R. BORK,
TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1984); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING Of·
AMERICA (1989).
192. I am employing these terms in a fairly specific way. The meaning of the text is that
which is represented by the text and the significance is the relationship between the meaning and
the facts at hand. See Jeffery A Aman and H. Wayne House, Constitutional Interpretation and The
Question of Lawful Authority, 18 MEM. ST. L. R. I, 20-21 (1987), quoting E.D. HIRSCH, JR,
VALIDITY [N INTERPRETATION (1967).
193. The list of criteria given are in order of importance and have been adopted from Michael
A Paulsen, Religion, Equality, and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, til NOTRE DAME L. R. 311, at 325 (1986).
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Establishment Clause along with a critique of these models utilizing the
analysis developed in the proper meaning I have suggested. Last, I will
conclude with a suggested approach that is consistent with my proposed
understanding of the Establishment Clause and inclusive of tests examined
in this portion.

1.

The meaning of the establishment clause in the First Amendment

a.

The text of the Establishment Clause

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares, in
pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 194 The
operative words in the Establishment Clause include "respecting,"
"establishment," and "religion." The word "respecting" implies that the
types of laws that Congress cannot make about "an establishment of
religion," would include both proscriptive and prescriptive legislation. 195
One author has suggested that, in this "field" [e.g., "an establishment of
religion"], "there was to be a total lack of legislative power insofar as
Congress was concerned." 196 The term "respecting" is synonymous with
"concerning, and regarding" which implies that the First Amendment did
not prohibit an establishment of religion per se, it merely prohibited
Congress from making any law "concerning or regarding an establishment
of religion." 197
The word "establishment," is synonymous with "institution,"
"organization," "business," "company," or "enterprise." Thus, an
establishment of religion would be a religious organization, or institution.
As it is shown infra, this definition is substantiated by the records covering
the proposed versions of the First Amendment Establishment Clause. 198

194. U.S. Const. amend I.
19'\. Paulsen, supra note 193, at 321. See also CORD, supra note 17, at 9 and 2'\.
196. EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS I 04 (1957). The author makes an interesting
point in footnote 5, which accompanies the text, wherein he states that the "exertion of federal
Judicial power to make the First Amendment applicable to the states, by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause would undoubtedly have shocked the framers of the Bill of Rights."
The reason for this lies in the nature of invoking the establishment clause. When the Supreme Court
does so, it prohibits establishment of religion by the state, an activity outside the realm of
Congressional power. The exercise of federal judicial power beyond the legislative authority of
Congress was condemned in Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938), as
unconstitutional usurpation.
197. CORD, supra note 17, at 9.
198. See infra note 247; and see EIDSMOE, supra note l7 at 130-132.
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This concept of "establishment" is linked inseparably with the term
religion in the Establishment Clause. 199 Yet the shifting meaning of the
term religion in the First Amendment has made it difficult for the Court
over the years to determine exactly what is not to be established by the
Congress. This failure to adequately define "religion" makes one wonder
whether we are at the conundrum of Justice Stewart who said that he could
not define obscenity but he knew it when he saw it. 200 Note the words of
Judge Augustus N. Hand in Kauten:
It is unnecessary to attempt a definition of religion; the
content of the term is found in the history of the human race
and is incapable of compression into a few words. Religious
belief arises from a sense of the inadequacy of reason as a
means of relating the individual to his fellow-men in the most
primitive and in the most highly civilized societies. It accepts
the aid of logic but refuses to be limited by it. It is a belief
finding expression in a conscience which categorically requires
the believer to disregard elementary self-interest and to accept
martyrdom in preference to transgressing its tenets. 201

The Second Circuit, in Kauten, on the one hand, says that there is no
need to "attempt" a definition of religion. Then it turns immediately
around and describes religion in opposition to reason. Religion supposedly
relates to conscience and the willingness to self-sacrifice and even
martyrdom. Two elements appear to exist under the definition given by the

199. Although it is linked with the tenn "an establishment"' in the first clause, it is not in the
second part or free exercise clause. This point of distinction has led many to search for a definition
of religion that is compatible in free exercise and establishment clause analysis. For varying views
see, Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. Ill. L. REv. 579; Note,
Defining Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 ( 1965 ); George
C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion", 71 GEo. L.
J. 1519 (1983); Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753
(1984); Timothy L. Hall, The Sacred and Projime: A First Amendment Definition of Religion. 61
TEX. L. REv. 805 (1982); Gail Mere!, The Protection of Individual Choice.· A Consistent
Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment. 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805 ( 1978); Stanley
Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233.
at note 3 ( 1989).
200. "I shall not today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing
so. But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that." J acobellis
v. State of Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J. concurring). This approach to defining, or
faining not to define, tenns is reflected also in Roe v. Wade, where Justice Blackmun, writing for
the Court, felt it unnecessary to defend when life began (though this was the pivotal issue in
balancing claims) and then defined it as not beginning until the third trimester. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 159 (1973). This slight of hand in cases like religion, obscenity, and abortion may be
difficult for Justices, but it is no excuse for making hard, and properly infonned, choices on their
part.
201. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (1943).
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court: religion relates to irrationality202 and to willingness to die rather than
transgress one's beliefs. Surely such is too limiting and even contradictory
to a person's own religious faith. For example, the court has used
examples of such martyrs "found in the history of the human race" as
Martin Luther and Socrates. 203 This argument begs the question for how
does the court know this is a necessary component of religion without first
defining what a religion is. 204 This circular reasoning goes something like
this: Martyrdom is religious because people who were religious were
willing to be martyred. Would a soldier's willingness to die for the country
he loves be an example of religious belief, or would the unwillingness of a
person to die for his religious convictions demonstrate that he is not
religious? A better definition of religion and religious is needed.
A similar problem develops when one assumes that religion is pitted
against reason. One might refer to Hebrews in the New Testament where
the writer says, "Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the
evidence of things not seen." 205 Such an understanding of "religion" or
"religious" is inadequate. A person claiming no religion might be guided
by a similar definition waiting for a presumed gift at Christmas. The New
Testament also requires reason to explain religious experience: "always be
ready to give a defense to everyone who asks you a reason for the hope
that is in you, with meekness and fear." 206 As well, the writers of the New
Testament relied on objective criteria in deciding on the truthfulness of the
resurrection of Jesus Christ, 207 and disavowed beliefs absent credible
evidence, 208 and considered less than objective truth to be a sign of moral
failure. 209
Placing the religious (faith-based) and the secular (reason-based) in
juxtaposition minimalizes the importance of religion to the area of law. To

202. SeeDmitry N. Feofanov, Defining Religion: An Immodest Proposal, 23 HOFSTRA L.REV.
309, 329. The author suggests that "[t)he unique character of religion is brought about by its reliance
on faith, rather than reason, as an allegedly valid means of cognition." !d.
203. United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d at 708. The court stated:
A religious obligation forbade Socrates, even in order to escape condemnation, to entreat
his judges to acquit him. because he believed that it was their sworn duty to decide
questions without favor to anyone and only according to law. Such an obligation impelled
Martin Luther to nail his theses on the door of the church at Wittenburg and, when he
was summoned before Emperor Charles and the Diet of Worms, steadfastly to hold his
ground and to utter the oft quoted words: "I neither can nor will recant anything, since
it is neither right nor safe to act against conscience. Here I stand. I cannot do other. God
help me. Amen.
204. M. Ayers, Is a Workable Definition of Religion Possible in a Pluralistic Society:', 8
(unpublished paper on file with author).
205. Hebrews II :I (NKJV).
206. I Peter 3:15 (NKJV)
207. I Corinthians 15:3-8.
208. 2 Pet. 2:16, I Cor. 15:14.
209. I Corinthians 15:15.
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recognize, however, that all ideologies are based on unproved assumptions
and that faith can be reasonable, is to develop a level playing field for
religion and law. Paul Toscan rightly observes,
[A]ll ideologies are fundamentally religious. They are
grounded upon assumptions that are not susceptible of proof:
they are matters of faith .... Secular ideas, it is contended,
are premised on objective, verifiable, demonstrable data, while
theistic notions are based on no data at all, or at best, data
that is subjective, mystical, and nondemonstrable. Those who
make this argument fail to see that mysticism, subjectivism,
and faith undergird even the most objective of our knowledge
and data, as well as our information-gathering methods. In the
first place, all data must be interpreted: the bones, the
numbers, the photos, the readings taken on delicate scientific
equipment - all of the quantifiable and verifiable pieces take
on meaning only when they are arranged within the meaning
- giving framework of some hypothesis. Hypothesizing is,
itself, a subjective, even mystical, process. 210

A better definition of "religion" is needed for First Amendment
analysis. In trying to decide on a definition to guide them in First
Amendment cases, the Supreme Court has fluctuated between religion
needing content and religion only needing aspiration. Early cases which
recognized Christianity as the official religion of the country, and
religion 211 having content, gave way over the years to mere recognition that
Americans are a religious people and our institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being, 212 to finally, religion is an amorphous "belief" in some
ultimate reality. 213

210 Paul James Toscano. A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism in the Public
School.1. 1979 B.Y.U. L REv. 177. 200) (quoted in Feofanov. supra note 202, at 331 ).
211 In a letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams, Marshall acknowledged that
One great object of the colonial charters was avowedly the propagation of the Christian
faith. Means have been employed to accomplish this object. & those means have been
used by government.
No person, I believe. questions the importance of religion to the happiness of man even
during his existence m this world. It has at all times employed his most serious
meditation, & had a decided influence on his conduct. The American population is
entirely Christian, & with us, Christianity & Religion are identified. It would be strange,
indeed, if with such a people, or if institutions did not presuppose Christianity, & did not
often refer to it. & exhibit relation:; with It.
Letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1883), in DREISBACH, supra note 184, at 113114.

212. "We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 ( 1952) (Douglas, J .).
213. In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S
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One of the problems in finding a definition of religion for First
Amendment adjudication is that the term religion never meant only one
thing in the eighteenth century. At times the term refers to what would be
understood today as a "denomination" or a religious body with rituals and
doctrines, or more generally the Christian religion itself. In the words of
Chief Justice John Marshall, "The American population is entirely
Christian, & with us, Christianity & Religion are identified. It would be
strange, indeed, if with such a people, our institutions did not presuppose
Christianity, & did not often refer to it, & exhibit relations with it. " 214
Madison, for example, in speaking of the meaning of religion in the
First Amendment, uses it this way where he identifies Quakers and
Mennonites as separate "religions" and in the next sentence, as
"denominations" indicating that Madison considered the terms
synonymous. 215 This is a typical use referring "to an institution with a
recognized body of communicants who gather together regularly for
worship, and accept a set of doctrines offering some means of relating the
individual to what is taken to be the ultimate nature of reality." 216
At other times it speaks of morality and duties to the Creator, 217 as
found in the Northwest Ordinance, which in part reads, "[r]eligion,
morality and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the
happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be
encouraged." 218 In this sense, then, religion refers to a person's views
regarding his relationship with his Creator, and to the obligations that his
relationship imposes on him "of reverence for his being and character, and
of obedience to his will." 219
The preceding indicates that the term may indicate a religious
denomination, with rituals and particular doctrines, or religious beliefs that
direct one's acts toward God and others. Both of these perspectives may be
seen in the statement of the Macintosh Court, which said, "We are a
Christian people according to one another the equal right of religious
freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty of obedience to the
will of God. " 220
Yet identifying the American religion as Christian, and believing that
Christian people will seek to obey the Creator, did not resolve any First

333 ( 1970)
214. Letter from John Marshall to Jasper Adams (May 9, 1883), in DREISBACH, supra note
184, at ll3-ll4.
215. James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, in THE
MIND OF THE FOUNDER 8-16 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1973).
216. W. Reese, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION, s.v. "religion," 488.
217. Northwest Ordinance, Section 14, Article 3, 1787.
218 /d.
219 Davis v. Beason, 133 US 333 (1890).
220. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (l93l).

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

256

[Volume 13

Amendment problems. During the early period of First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Court acknowledged the need to look outside the
Constitution for a definition of religion. In the important Free Exercise
case of Reynolds, the Court dealt with the claim of a Mormon regarding
the matter of the religious practice of polygamy:
Congress cannot pass a law for the government of the
Territories which shall prohibit the free exercise of
religion . . . . The word "religion" is not defined in the
Constitution. We must go elsewhere, therefore, to ascertain its
meaning, and nowhere more appropriately, we think, than to
the history of the times in the midst of which the provision was
adopted. The precise point of the inquiry is, what is the
religious freedom which has been guaranteed. 221

In deciding what was a valid exercise of religion, the Court referred to
the prevailing, and historic, practice of Christianity which did not consider
polygamy as an element of religious free exercise.
On this hearing we can only consider whether ... an offense
was committed of which the territorial court had jurisdiction to
try the defendant. And on this point there can be no serious
discussion or difference of opinion. Bigamy and polygamy are
crimes by the laws of all civilized and Christian countries .. .
They tend to destroy the purity of the marriage relation ... .
Probably never before in the history of this country has it been
seriously contended that the whole punitive power of the
government for acts (i.e., polygamy), recognized by the general
consent of the Christian world in modern times as proper
matters for prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order
that the tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime may be
carried out without hindrance. 222

My point for mentioning these cases is not to decide the prudence of
the Court regarding whether Reynolds or Davis were decided rightly, but
that the decision on the nature of a religious activity was based on the
beliefs of Western Christianity and that the definition had content, rather
than being merely subjective. Moving from this approach in the two
polygamy cases mentioned here we may tum to Ballard, 223 where the
Court "significantly undermined the view expressed in Davis ... that

221.
222.
223.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. at 162.
Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. at 333, 341-343 (1890).
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S 7S (1944).

203]

A TALE OF TWO KINGDOMS

257

beliefs that 'offend the common sense of [Christian] mankind' are not
religious. " 224
The Court, as subsequent analysis of Establishment Clause cases will
reveal, seems to jostle 'between definitions for religions which have
traditional theistic elements and views that seem to be little different from
the basic beliefs that anyone and everyone in society might hold so that
religion has been robbed of any protection from the state. 225
John Eidsmoe provides a brief look at the stark changes in the
definition of religion by the Court:
1899, Holy Trinity:
1951, Zorach:

" ... this is a Christian nation."
"We are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being."
1961, Torcaso:
". . . neither can aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of
God as against those religions founded
on different beliefs."
1965, Seeger:
". . . whether a given belief that is
sincere and meaningful occupies a
place that is sincere and meaningful
occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the
orthodox belief in God."
The Court has thus moved from Christian, to religions
presupposing a Supreme Being, to religions whether or not
they believe in God, to whatever is meaningful to the
individual. Most of the Founding Fathers would only shake
their heads in disbelief.2 26

Moreover, the inability of the court to give a definition of religion in
the First Amendment has given rise to a number of inconsistent and
contradictory decisions, some which border on silliness. This undermines
the credibility and dignity of the Court. As we shall see below the fact that
the Court has truly not settled on a reasonable meaning of the word

224.

See Comment. Bevond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion Under the Constitution, 31
973. 979 (1982).
225. This is especially evident in the draft cases. In Kauten (133 F2d at 707) the Court
distinguished between beliefs formed from religious training and beliefs only philosophical. In SeeJ<er
(380 U.S. at 174) the Court required a broad theistic view of religion, while in Welsh (398 U.S 333.
335 ( 1970). any belief that would be based on a view of ultimate reality was acceptable. By the
latter definition the Court lost any serious distinction between strong personal views and religious
faith.
226. EIDSMOE, supra note 17, at 151-152.
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religion in the text of the First Amendment has caused them to adopt tests
that often are strained and which fail to adequately serve between the
interests of the state, the public sphere, and private religious interests. This
inconsistency has been illustrated by the comments of Keith Fournier,
which I have put into chart form for easy contrast: 227
Constitutional

Unconstitutional

A state may lend to parochial school
children geography textbooks that
contain maps of the United States.
Board of Education v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1938).

A State may not lend maps of the
United States for use in geography
class at parochial schools. Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 362-66
(1975).

A state may lend a science book to
parochial school children. Wolman
v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,249 (1977).

A state may not lend a science kit.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
249 (1977).

A state may lend textbooks on
American colonial history. Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 354-55, n.3
- 4 (1975).

A State may not lend a film on
George Washington, or a film
projector to show it in history class.
Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349,
354-55, n.3- 4 (1975).

A state may lend classroom
workbooks. Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 354-355, n.3- 4, 362-366
( 1975).

A state may not lend workbooks in
which the parochial school children
write, thus rendering them
nonreusable. Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 354-355, n.3 - 4, 362-366
(1975).

A state may pay for bus
transportation to religious schools.
Everson v. Board of Education, 330
U.S. I (1947).

A state may not pay for bus
transportation from the parochial
schools to the public zoo or natural
history museum for a field trip.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
252-255 ( 1977).

A state may pay for diagnostic
services conducted in the parochial
school. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349,367,371 (1975).

A state may pay for therapeutic
services but they must be given in a
different building. Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367, 371
( 1975).

227. Keith A. Fournier, In the Wake of Weisman: The Lemon Test is Still a Lemon, But the
Psycho-Coercion Test is More Bitter Still. 2 REGENT U. L.REV. I. 23 ( 1992).

203]

A TALE OF TWO KINGDOMS

259

Constitutional

Unconstitutional

A state may conduct speech and
hearing diagnostic testing inside the
sectarian school. Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 241 (1977).

A state may not conduct speech and
hearing "services" inside the
sectarian school. Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 367, 371 (1975).

A state may provide counseling to
exceptional parochial school students
if outside of the parochial school
such as a trailer parked down the
street. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229,241-248 (1977); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 352, n. 2,
367-373.

A state may not provide counseling
to exceptional school students unless
outside of the parochial school such
as a trailer parked down the street.
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
241-248 (1977); Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 352, n. 2, 367-373.

A state may give cash to a parochial
school to pay for the administration
of state-written test and state-ordered
reporting services. Comm. for
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).

A state may not provide funds for
teacher-prepared tests on secular
subjects. Levitt v. Comm. for Public
Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
413 U.S. 472 (1973).

A state (public school) may release
students during the day for religion
classes elsewhere and may enforce
attendance at those classes. Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952);
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110Ill, 127-136(1985).

A state (public school) may not
provide for religious instruction
inside a public school. Illinois ex rei.
McCollum v. Board of Education,
333 U.S. 203 (1948).

One might add many other examples but a couple will suffice. 228 A
state legislature may begin each day with a prayer by state paid
chaplains, 229 but students in public school may not begin each day in
prayer. 230 A school may not display the Ten Commandments in the
classroom 231 but the doors leading into the U.S. Supreme Court chambers,
as well as the wall behind the justice display the Ten Commandments. 232

228. For several other examples see Paulsen, supra note 193, at 315-316.
229. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 US 783 (1983).
230. Wallace v. Jaffree, 1055 SCt. 2479 (1985).
231 Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 ( 1980) (holding the Kentucky statute on posting the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause): see
Paul Grimely Kuntz, The Ten Commandments on School Room Walls~ Whv Did the Supreme Court
Re;ect the 1971\ Kentucky Statute (Stone v (;mham}.' Could Such 11 L11w Succeed~. lJ U FLA. J.L
& PUB. PoL'Y I (1997) (analyzing the Kentucky Ten Commandments Statute and suggesting ways
in which it might it might be rewritten to pass constitutional muster).
232. See comment by BORK, supra note 15, at 5.
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The Founders' intent

In discussing intent, the proper methodology one should use must be
established. Most of the scholars who have argued against interpreting the
Establishment Clause and the rest of the Constitution by examining the
intent of those who have drafted it have argued that the intent of the
Framers is impossible to determine. Further, if one could determine the
intent, it is irrelevant to the modem application of the clause. 233 However,
those who advocate what has been labeled "interpreti vism" or
"originalism" argue that the historical record is clear enough to establish,
though not demonstrate, 234 the intent of those who framed the
Constitution. 235
This seems to be the most reasonable methodology since it coincides
with the way premises are accepted or rejected in almost every other area
of mediated study. 236 As it has been noted, to argue that since the historian
is a product of his or her own time and objectivity is impossible, one
confuses the content of knowledge with the process of obtaining it. One
also engages in a self - defeating endeavor since the very statement that

233. See Borris I. Bittker. The Bicentennial of the Juri.1prudence ol Original Intent: The Recent
Past, 77 CAL. L. REV. 235 (1989); and Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the
Framers: The Limits of Fiistorical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 349 (1989) (for a response to the
objections raised by this author see Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U.L. REV. 226 (1988)). It should be noted
that there is a whole panoply of methodologies which have been suggested for constitutional
adjudication. Among some of the more innovative ones are: RoNALD D. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (I 977) (arguing for an interpretation of the constitution as laying down "moral concepts"
rather than "particular conceptions" which require the court to frame and "answer questions ut
political morality," /d. at 147); John Leubsdorf, Deconstructing the Constitution, 40 STAN. L. RFV
181 (1987) (arguing that the literary theory of deconstructionism, a methodology which presupposes
an inherent conflict between contradictory principles or ideas in any text, as applied to the
constitution may offer some new insights into the "meaning" of the text); and Daniel S. Goodman,
American Cofl.ltitutionalism and the Myth of" the Creative Era, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 753 (I 989)
(criticizing the originalist or interpretivist position and offers a view of constitutionalism which
demands social progress as an end to any legitimate methodology).
234. Much of the criticism of this position, supra at note 233, comes from the contention that
absolute certainty cannot be obtained from history. However, as demonstrated in the following portton
of the text, the methodology that embraces historical objectivity does not require certainty; rather.
it searches for the meaning that is supported by the evidence. See Aman and House, supra note I 92.
at 16- I 9 for additional arguments on the possibility of historical objectivity in constitutional
interpretation.
235. See Kay, supra note 233, at 236-243; Aman & House, supra note 192, at 16- I 9. In our
article, we offer a philosophical argument for historical objectivity and note that objectivity is not
"absolute" knowledge but a ·:fair but revisable" presentation that reasonable men and women should
accept.
236. A man & House, supra note I 92, at 18. The example given is that of geology where
fragmentary evidence is analyzed and hypotheses are accepted or rejected based on an underlying
epistemology that assumes the possibility of historical objectivity.
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one cannot come to objective historical conclusions is itself a historical
conclusion that asserts itself as an objective one. 237
After determining that objective statements about historical events are
possible, one can then tum to the documents surrounding the drafting and
adoption of the First Amendment to discover the intent of those who
framed it. Since numerous documentations can be analyzed, I will attempt
only a cursory review of those documents typically invoked when one
desires to determine the intent of the Framers, and a more detailed look at
documents that are relevant but often ignored. 238
In Everson, 239 the Court looked to documents drafted by both Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison as controlling in the Court's interpretation of
the Establishment Clause. 240 In fact, one historian has suggested that
Justice Black's treatment of the history of the First Amendment would
lead one to the conclusion that "Madison and Jefferson fought the battle
for religious freedom in Virginia, wrote a few letters on the subject, and
then retired from the issue of defining the proper relationship between
Church and State." 241 In Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance," 242
Madison argues against the use of governmental authority to enforce
inequality and for the "equal right of every citizen to the free exercise of
his Religion according to the dictates of conscience." 243 Additionally,
Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptists was, at best, an opinion
about a constitutional provision enacted while he was in France. 244
Furthermore, the views were distilled from the "Virginia Bill of Religious
Liberty," which was proposed prior to the events of the Constitutional
Congress. 245 Although the documents preceding the Congress which
contain Madison's view of Church and State are important, the events
during and immediately proceeding the Congress may, perhaps, be more
relevant in light of the collective effort that was put forth to draft the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
This leads one to examine a number of Madison's actions before,
during, and after the co-drafting of the First Amendment. Among these
include Madison's membership on the Congressional Committee that

2~7.
ld
238 In the proceeding section, I will rely primarily upon the work of CORD. supra note 17,
at lX-82
239 330 U.S. at 16,18.
240. 330 U.S at 11-13
CORD, supra note 17, at 121.
241
242. TOWARD A BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY: CHURCH, STATE, AND THE SUPREME COURT 586
(Ronald B. Flowers & Robert T. Miller eds., 1987).
243. /d. See also Paulsen, supra note 193, at 326.
244. See CORD, supra note 17, at 36-47, 120-122, 133-143; Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at
2508-20 (Rehnquist J ., dissenting); Paulsen, supra note 193, at 326.
245. Cmm, supra note 17. at 20-23.
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recommended the Chaplaincy system, 246 Madison's initial draft of the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, 247 Madison's successful
proposal for a law punishing Sabbath breakers which was passed the same
year as the "Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom," 248 and Madison's
"Thanksgiving Day" proclamations passed during his presidency. 249 All of
these would lead one to think that the caricature of Madison as a strict
separationist contains little, if any, validity when the historical record is
examined.
Madison's actions, 250 taken in conjunction with the actions of the
Congress which served under the early presidencies, lead to the historical
premise that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was drafted
primarily to proscribe the actions of Congress in regards to the
establishment of a national religion and the preferential treatment of one
sect over others. 251 This particular premise is also in agreement with the
historical understanding of Church and State held by those who helped
settle America and those who later drafted the Constitution. 252
c.

The historical precedence prior to Everson

Prior to the Everson case in 1947, the Supreme Court had examined
relatively few cases that dealt with the Establishment Clause. In this
subsection, I will go through those cases and examine them for a possible
understanding of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Establishment
Clause prior to Everson and its progeny.
In Bradfield v. Roberts, 253 a suit was brought to enjoin the
performance of an agreement between a private hospital run by a monastic
order, Sisters of Charity, and the Commissioners of the District of

246. CORD. supra note 17, at 23.
247. "The Civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor
shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of Conscience he in any
manner, or any pretext, infringed." !d. As Cord points out, it is clear from this proposed amendment
that Madison viewed the establishment of a state-church as an evil to be protected against through
the First Amendment.
248. ld at 217-19.
249. !d. at 219.
250. /d.
251. For a detailed analysis, see CoRD, supra note 17, at 49-82. Cord cites numerous
documents, including early treaties with American Indians, to support the historicity of the premise
that the Establishment Clause does not embrace a strict separationist view hut an accommodationist
one.
252. For some excellent examples of this, see MARNELL, supra note 189; WINTHROP STILL
HUDSON & JOHN CORRIGAN, RELIGION IN AMERICA (1965); and SIDNEY E. MEAD, THE LIVELY
EXPERIMENT ( 1963).
253. 175 U.S. 291 (1899). The following analysis is taken from Corm, supra note 17. at 10304.
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Columbia and the Surgeon General. 254 The plaintiff, a U.S. citizen and
taxpayer, brought the suit on the grounds that it violated the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. 255 The Supreme Court held that, despite
the alleged "sectarian character of the hospital," 256 the agreement did not
violate the Establishment Clause since the case was one of "a secular
corporation being managed by people who hold to the doctrines of the
Roman Catholic Church, but who nevertheless are managing the
corporation according to the law under which it exists." 257
The next case involved the use of a Congressional Trust to pay a
Roman Catholic Mission to educate members of the Sioux tribe. 258 In this
case, members of the Sioux Tribe brought suit for themselves and all other
members to enjoin the Commissioner of Indian Affairs from using Indian
funds to execute the contract with the Catholic Missions. The contract was
allegedly forbidden by the Indian appropriation acts of 1895, 1896, 1897,
1898, and 1899. 259 The Court analyzed the case not under the
Establishment Clause but strictly within the confines of the claim that
payments under the contract were in conflict with the prohibitions of the
appropriation acts. The Court found that the funds were not traceable to
monies made available under the acts and, hence, were not subject to the
prohibitions. 260
In both Pierce v. Society of Sisters 261 and Cochran v. Louisiana State
Board of Education, 262 the Court had the opportunity to review what,
potentially, were cases involving First Amendment issues. However, since
the Establishment Clause had not been incorporated yet, the Court
analyzed each case under an equal protection, Fourteenth Amendment,
analysis. In Pierce, the Court discussed the "liberties" which the
Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed; and it found that among these liberties
was the right of parents to teach their children as they chose. 263 This
substantive "right" was "found" within the concept of "liberty" in the
Fourteenth Amendment. In Cochran, Louisiana's state legislature had
enacted a law providing for the purchase of secular textbooks for use by
school children, including those enrolled in parochial schools. 264 The law
was challenged on the basis that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids states

254. /d. at 295.
255 /d.
256. /d.
257. /d. at 298-99.
25X. Rueben Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S 50 (1908). The following analysis of this cas.;
is also taken from CoRD, supra note 17, at 104-06.
259. /d. at 80.
260. /d. at 77-78.
261 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
262. 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
263. 268 U S at 534, 535.
264. 281 U.S. at 373.
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from depriving persons of their property without due process of law. 265 The
Court rejected this argument, stating that the benefits of the program were
not to the parochial schools but to the children of the state of Louisiana, 266
and introduced the "child benefit theory", a consideration used when
examining state aid to parochial schools. 267

d.

The meaning of the Establishment Clause prior to Everson

One can adduce from a historical analysis that an understanding of the
Establishment Clause, prior to 1947, was one that viewed the clause as
restricting an establishment of national religion 26 ~ and any preferential
treatment to a particular religious sect. 269 The writings of both Madison
and Jefferson, as well as the acts of the initial presidents and Congress 270
and pre-1947 Court decisions, amply demonstrate this premise. Having
established this, I shall now tum to Everson and the subsequent cases to
evaluate them in light of this historical perspective of the Establishment
Clause.

2.

Everson and its progeny

a.

Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township 271

The line of demarcation for church-state law was established in
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township. With this case the
states were limited in their ability to define church-state relations and a
"wall of separation" was placed between the previously friendly
relationship of these two spheres of American life. Knicely says,
The 194 7 Everson case effected a profound shift of power
premised upon what Professor Howe has described as "the
blunt and undocumented assumption that when the nation
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment it was the people's
purpose to outlaw all state laws respecting an establishment of
religion, even those which do not appreciably affect property,
liberty or equality." Whereas before Everson the states had
been free to define church-state relationships, Everson
withdrew from "the states the ability to define church-state

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271

!d. at 374.
!d. at 375.
!d. See also Flowers & Miller, supra note 242, at 453.
See CORD. supra note 17, at 229.
See Bradfield v. Roberts, supra note 188 at 297-298.
See CORD, supra note 17, at 21-83.
330 US I (1947)
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relationships within their own jurisdictions." More
importantly, Everson, in effect, subjected the states to a
uniform national regime of law expounded by the Supreme
Court. Prior to Everson, there were few, if any, Establishment
Clause decisions in any of the federal courts. After Everson,
they have been legion. Lower court judges, lawyers,
commentators, and government officials must now read the tea
leaves ofthe United States Report quite literally to discern the
height, length, and depth of what Justice Jackson once
predicted would be, and has now become, the "serpentine wall"
dividing church and state. The power of elected government to
act benevolently toward religion and the moral values
associated with it, once geared more loosely to standards
prevalent in the communities of the states, is now bound by a
straitjacket of judicial doctrine that has become increasingly
indecipherable because of shifting divisions on the Court 272

In Everson, the Supreme Court was faced with a case in
which the Ewing Township Board of Education, pursuant to
authority granted to it by a New Jersey statute, authorized
reimbursement to parents of money expended by them for public
bus transportation of their children to and from school. 273 Part of
this money went to parents for the payment of transportation to
and from parochial schools. 274 The appellant was a taxpayer in
the school district who brought the suit as a violation of
provisions in the state and federal constitutions, 275 claiming that
the action of the school board violated both the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment as made applicable to the states
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 276
The first contention raised by the appellant was readily
dismissed by the Court on the grounds that the "fact that a state
law, passed to satisfy a public need, coincides with the personal
desires of the individuals most directly affected is certainly an
inadequate reason for us to say that a law has erroneously
appraised the public need." 277 This is the same reasoning found

272.
273.
274.
275.

276.
277.

Knicely. supra note 25. at 275 (footnotes omitted).
330 U.S. at 3.
/d.

/d. at 4.
/d. at 5.
!d. at 4.
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in Cochran 278 that held a tax may be constitutionally valid even
if the people against whom it is levied are not directly benefited
by the tax. 279
The second contention the Court examined was the
Establishment Clause issue. After a brief analysis of the various
persecutions of sects which have allegedly flowed from
government favored churches, 280 the Court looked at the history
of establishment of church-states and state-churches 281 in the
colonies, with particular emphasis on Virginia, 282 which Justice
Black saw as the paradigm for proper analysis. 283 Justice Black
concluded his historical analysis with this often quoted passage:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one
religion over another . . . . No tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against the establishment of religion by law was intended to
erect "a wall of separation between church and State."284

By making this statement, Justice Black effectively incorporated not
only the Establishment Clause but also an interpretation of that clause built
on a concept of strict separation between church and state.m By using the

278. 281 U.S. 370 (1930), see infra text accompanying note 297.
279. /d. at 375.
280. 330 U.S. at 8.
281. For an excellent discussion arguing that two "types" of institutions existed in the colonial
era and into the early 19th century (e.g. the "state-church" [Virginia, Georgia] and the "church-state"
[Massachusetts]). see MARNELL, supra note 189, at 63-72 and 49-61, respectively. Marnell argues
that the reformation era led to the "Calvinistic" styled church-state of New England, specifically
Massachusetts, and the English style of the established church influenced the state-church model
followed in the South.
282. 330 U.S. at II.
283. /d. at 12-14.
284. !d. at 15-16.
285. See SMITH, supra note 189, at 299. Concerning this opinion, Smith wrote:
With the dicta of Everson we enter the golden age of the doctrine of separation of church
and state. Roger Williams' famous metaphor has never been more loudly saluted nor
more unjustly burdened with so much that is strange to its earliest pronouncement than
in the train of the Everson case.
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verb "means" to preface his discussion of the Establishment Clause,
Justice Black makes an assertion about the historical meaning of the test as
applied today, opening his analysis to critical evaluation.
One of the most glaring problems most have noticed about Justice
Black's decision is the selective use of the historical data. 286 For example,
both Justice Black's opinion and Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion 287
completely ignore pertinent facts surrounding the adoption of the First
Amendment. 288 Justice Black's suggestion that the Establishment Clause
"means" that neither state nor Federal government may aid "all"
religions 289 seems to contradict completely the historical record,
particularly when both James Madison and early Congresses appropriated
aid for various religious groups. 290
Additionally, Justice Black's use of Jefferson's letter to the Danbury
Baptists and his adoption of Jefferson's metaphor 91 provide further insight
into the failure to examine fully the record. 292 As one author notes,293 only
one year after Jefferson wrote his letter to the Danbury Baptists he
approved a treaty with the Kaskaskia Indians, pledging federal money to
build them a Roman Catholic Church and to support their priest. 294
Despite the glaring selectivism applied to the historical record that
produced a strict separationist perspective, a further question is raised by
the last lines of the majority opinion. Justice Black writes, "The First
Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must
be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach.
New Jersey has not breached it here." 295 If Justice Black's earlier statement

286. See Smith, supra note 189, at 298; CORD, supra note 17, at 103; and MARNELL, supra
note 189. Even 'trict separationist Leonard Levy sees the grave problems with Black's analysis:
Black did not merely misread history, nor wishfully attribute to it a factual content that
it did not possess; he mangled and manipulated it by artfully selecting facts from one side
only, by generalizing from grossly inadequate 'proof,' by ignoring confusion and even
contradictions in the minds of some of his key historical protagonists, and by assuming
that silence on the part of their opponents signified acquiescence. In this way he invoked
the fatherhood of 'the framers' in support of his position.
LEVY, supra note 26 at 68-69.
287 330 US at 28 (J Rutledge, et aL, dissenTing).
288 See supra notes 23-36.
289. 330 U.S. at 15.
290. See CoRD, supra note 17, at 112, for his discussion of the early appropriation acts, signed
into law by Madison, which authorized the expenditure of Federal funds for the aid of various
religious groups working among the Indian tribes. This is particularly relevant since these early
actions involved Congressional action that is specifically addressed by the Establishment Clause.
291. 330 U.S. at 16, 18. See also Dreisbach, supra note 17.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 286-94.
293 See CoRD, supra note 17, at 115.
294. !d. Cord's point is well taken. If Jefferson meant by the "wall of separation" a "high and
impregnable" wall (330 U.S. at 18), he would not have signed the treaty since the treaty provides
aid to a religious institution.
295. 330 U.S. at 18.
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was applicable to the existing facts, one wonders how he could conclude
that this wall was not breached. In fact the dissenting Justices, led by
Justice Rutledge, criticized the majority's opinion for not following the
logical conclusion of its analysis. 296 However, if one examines the analysis
given by the majority, their reliance upon the aid which is given to all
citizens and which may coincide with the desires of some is similar to the
argument given by the Cochran Case in upholding the Louisiana statute. 297
In Cochran, the Court upheld a statute which gave secular textbooks to all
children in the state and which happened to benefit those children going to
the parochial schools. 298
While it rejects the majority's opinion, the dissent in Everson adopts
the same historical arguments to conclude that the Establishment Clause
requires strict separation of church and state. 299 Thus the dissent engages in
the same selective use of the historical documents, relying primarily on
Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" and Jefferson's Letter. 300

b.

McCollum 301 to Lemon 302

Although the majority upheld as constitutional the program of the
school district in Everson, it was only a matter of time before the strict
separationist dicta of Everson was used to defeat state action under the
Establishment Clause. In fact the very next year, 1948, the Court in
McCollum v. Board of Education 303 ruled that a release time program for
religious instruction violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The Court relied on the conclusion reached in Everson that
the "wall of separation" between church and state "must be kept high and
impregnable" 304 while at the same time rejecting the state's argument that
the First Amendment, historically, was intended to forbid "only
government preference of one religion over another. " 305
In subsequent cases, the Court gradually developed some tests for the
application of the Establishment Clause to suspect state action. In Engel v.

296. !d. at 49. See also Justice Jackson's remark that the majority's opinion reminds him of
"Julia, who according to Byron's reports. 'whispering "I ne'er consent,"consented.'" (330 U.S at
19)
297. !d. at 7; cf 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
298. 281 U.S. at 374.
299. See 330 U.S. at 26-27 (Jackson, J., with Frankfurter, J., joining); !d. at 31-42 (Rutledge.
J .. et aJ.).
300. !d.
301. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
302. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
303. 333 U.S. at 203.
304. !d. at 212.
305. !d. at 211.
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Vitale, 300 the Court held that a non-denominational prayer, required by the
public board of education and drafted by a state agency which was recited
at the beginning of each school day, violated the Establishment Clause.
The Court utilized the same historical analysis as Everson 307 and
concluded that strict separation of church and state must be sustained. 308
Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion, 309 stated that "the great
condition of religious liberty is that it be maintained free from sustenance
as also from other interferences, by the state." 310 He found support for this
statement, which points towards the test by his majority opinion in
Lemon, ' 11 in Justice Rutledge's dissent in EverJBn.
In another case
decided almost one year later, School District of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 313 the Court ruled that a statute requiring the reading of ten
verses from the Bible without comment at the beginning of each school
day in public school classrooms violates the Establishment Clause, even if
individual students may be excused. 314 The Court again squarely rejected
the state's contention that the First Amendment forbids only governmental
preference of one religion over another.m Furthermore, the Court
expanded on the neither aiding nor inhibiting of religion test set forth by
Justice Douglas in Engel. 316 The Court found:

The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the
advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment
exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the strictures of
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits
religion. 317

The Court felt that this test was consistent with the interpretation of
the Establishment Clause that they adopted in the ruling and, for that
matter, which was adopted in Everson, McCollum, and Engel.

306.
307.
308.
309.

:no
311
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317

370 U.S. at 421
/d. at 428.
/d. at 436.
/d. at 437
!d. at 444.
403 US. 602, 612-13 (1971).
330 U.S. at 29.
374 us. 203 ( 1963).
!d. at 223.
/d. at 216.
Supra note 306 and accompanying text.
374 US. at 222 (emphasis added)
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The Lemon 318 test, a "tripart" analsyis:

Prior to this decision, the Court applied a rough test of several
factors including purpose and effect, 319 but not entanglement. In
Lemon, the Court held that a proper Establishment Clause analysis of
any state or Federal action should include a tripart test:
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, Board of Education v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968); finally, the statute must not foster
"an excessive government entanglement with religion." 320
Under this tri-part test, the Establishment Clause allegedly takes
a "neutral" stand towards religion, promoting government activity in
extending general benefits to nonreligious and religious interests
alike. 321
In most of the decisions that soon followed Lemon, the Court
upheld the application of this tripart test in an Establishment Clause
analysis. In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 322 the Court analyzed a New York statute which permitted
financial aid to non-public elementary and secondary schools. The
Court reaffirmed the analysis of Everson, 323 and it adopted the test as
expounded in Lemon. 324 The Court determined that the New York
statute, "as written," violated the second prong of the Lemon test by
having a "primary effect that advances religion." 325 In Wallace v.
Jaffree, 326 the Court characterized the Establishment Clause as
requiring "complete neutrality towards religion," citing the strict
separation decisions. 327 The Court found that the Alabama statute,
which allowed for a voluntary moment of silence, not to exceed one
minute, at the beginning of each school day328 violated the first prong
of the Lemon test by having "no secular purpose."329

318. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971).
319. Supra note 317.
320. 403 U.S. at 612-13.
321. See Bird, Freedom From Establishment and Unneutrality in Public School instruction and
Religious School Regulation, 1979 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 143-154.
322. 413 US. 756 (1973).
323. !d. at 770.
324. Supra note 320.
325. 413 U.S. at 798.
326. 472 U.S 38 (1985)
327. !d. at 52.
328. /d. at 38.
329. /d. at 55 (holding that a statute must have a secular legislative purpose whose pnmary
effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion).
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Finally the fourth prong suggested in Lemon, which Justice Brennan
and Justice Marshall sought to be added, the "political devisiveness" test,
entails difficulty in that it takes the providence of political interaction
within a democratic society away from the people and legislatures and
places it with the life tenured Court. I find it hard to believe that Brennan,
Marshall, and Burger are attempting to save us from a political controversy
which they feel we just don't have time enough to consider. Chief Justice
Burger announced that it "goes against our entire history and tradition to
permit questions of the Religion Clauses to assume such importance in our
legislatures and in our elections that they could divert attention from (other
issues)." 330

d.

Deviations from Lemon

Not all the Court's decisions have so willingly followed the Everson
line of cases. In fact, some have significantly deviated from the strict
separationist approach. Zorach v. Clauson 331 is a relatively close case to
the Everson decision which departed from the strict separation approach.
In Zorach, w the Court examined a released time program that enabled
public school students to receive religious instruction off school grounds
during the school day for an hour each week. 333 The Court ruled that this
released time program did not violate the Establishment Clause, because it
merely accommodated religious belief and acknowledged the nation's
religious heritage. Note the following language:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State.
Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in
which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on
the other. That is the common sense matter. Otherwise the
state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly .... The government must be
neutral when it comes to competition between sects. 334

330.
331
332.
333.
334.

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 US 602 (1971).
343 U.S. 306 (! 952)
!d.
!d.
!d. at 312, 314 (emphasis added).
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The neutrality that the Court talks about in Zorach 335 seems at odds
with the neutrality mentioned in Lemon 336 and those cases following it. In
Zorach, neutrality is equivalent to accommodation without preferentialism.
Since the release program was off school grounds and voluntary, the Court
found no problem with accommodating the religious needs of the
students. 337
In a subsequent case, Marsh v. Chambers,m the Court was faced with
a challenge to a state legislature's use of a paid chaplain who opened each
session with the chaplain's prayer. 339 The Court did not mention the tripart
test 340 and, instead, opted to use an alternative historical test.341 The Court
also quoted Zorach approvingly, stating that" '[w]e are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being.' Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 313 (1952)." 342 This case presents a rather refreshing approach
that rejects a test when the overwhelming historical evidence points to the
practice as a permissible means of accommodation.
One year after Marsh, the Court decided a case 343 that addressed the
display of a creche in a city park. The creche was owned by a non-profit
organization and included with the nativity scene a Santa Claus house, a
Christmas tree, and a "Seasons Greetings" banner. 344 The Court found that
the display did not violate the tripart test in Lemon since the "City has a
secular purpose for including the creche ... the City has not impermissibly
advanced religion, and that including the creche does not create excessive
entanglement between religion and govemment." 345 In analyzing the
second part of the test, the Court found that some advancement or
accommodation is permissible since the Court "has refused 'to construe
the Religion Clauses with a literalness that would undermine the ultimate
constitutional objective as illuminated by history.' Walz v. Tax
Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 671 (1970)." 346
A case that is similar to Lynch in its accommodationist use of the
Lemon test is Bowen v. Kendrick. 347 In this case, the Court looked at the

335. !d. 306.
336. 403 U.S 602.
337. 343 U.S. at 313-314.
338 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
339. !d.
340. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
34 I 463 U.S. at 791. The Court states, "This unique history leads us to accept the
interpretation of the First Amendment draftsmen who saw no real threat to the Establishment Clause
arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now challenged." !d.
342. !d. at 792.
343. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
344. !d. at 671.
345. !d. at 685.
346. !d. at 678.
347. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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validity of the Adolescent Family Life Act which provided for, in part, aid
to organizations that provided services necessary for the care of pregnant
adolescent parents and adolescent parents. 348 The court rejected the
Establishment claim, finding that the primary effect of the statute did not
advance religion due to the "long history of cooperation and
interdependency between governments and charitable or religious
organizations." 349 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, states in a
concurring opinion that the fact that public funds go to pervasively
sectarian institutions is not sufficient to invalidate a statute that has been
found constitutional on its face. 350
Possibly the most significant Establishment Clause case since Lemon
is Agostini v. Felton. 351 Agostini has squarely moved from a strict
separationist position to an accommodationist approach regarding the issue
of government aid that directly aids the educational religious
organizations. The significance of this case is evident when the Court
contrasted two earlier cases in its analysis.
In Aguilar v. Felton, 352 the United States Supreme Court, in applying
the Lemon test, held that New York City's program that sent public school
teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education necessitated
an excessive entanglement of church and state and, therefore, violated the
Establishment Clause. In a companion case, School District of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 353 the Supreme Court held that a "Shared Time" program
was analogous to New York City's Title I program and, therefore, was
invalid. The Court found in both cases that providing government funding
for religious organizations violated the third prong of Lemon. Since
parochial schools were deemed to have an atmosphere dedicated to the
advancement of religious belief, any instruction in that atmosphere was
perceived to create "[t]he potential for impermissible fostering of
religion. " 35 ~
According to Ball, the presence of public teachers on parochial school
grounds had a second related impermissible effect: It created a "graphic
symbol of the 'concert or union or dependency' of church and state," 355
especially when perceived by "children in their formative years." 356 The
Court feared that this perception of a symbolic union between church and

348.
349.
350.
the entity
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

42 U.SC ~§ 300z to 300z-l0 (1982).
487 U.S. at 604.
/d. at 622. Justice Kennedy states, "the question in an as-applied challenge is not whether
is ol a religious character. but how it spends its grant."
Agostini v. Felton, 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997).
473 U.S. 402, 413 (1985).
473 U.S. 373 (1985)
/d. at 386 (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975))
/d. at 391 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 US. 306, 312 (1952)).
/d. at 390.
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state would "conve[y] a message of government endorsement . . . of
religion" and thereby violate a "core purpose" of the Establishment
Clause. 357
Third, the Court found that the Shared Time program impermissibly
financed religious indoctrination by subsidizing "the primary religious
mission of the institutions affected. " 358 The Court separated its prior
decisions evaluating programs that aided the secular activities of religious
institutions into two categories: those in which it concluded that the aid
resulted in an effect that was "indirect, remote, or incidental" (and upheld
the aid); and those in which it concluded that the aid resulted in "a direct
and substantial advancement of the sectarian enterprise" (and invalidated
the aid). 359 In light of Meek and Wolman, Grand Rapids' program fell into
the latter category.
The New York City Title I program challenged in Aguilar closely
resembled the Shared Time program struck down in Ball, but the Court
found fault with an aspect of the Title I program not present in Ball: The
Board had "adopted a system for monitoring the religious content of
publicly funded Title I classes in the religious schools." 360 Even though
this monitoring system might prevent the Title I program from being used
to inculcate religion, the Court concluded, as it had in Lemon and Meek,
that the level of monitoring necessary to be "certain" that the program had
an exclusively secular effect would "inevitably resul[t] in the excessive
entanglement of church and state," thereby running afou I of Lemon's third
prong.>6t
The Court's conclusion that the Shared Time program in Ball had the
impermissible effect of advancing religion rested on three assumptions: (i)
any public employee who works on the premises of a religious school is
presumed to inculcate religion in her work; (ii) the presence of public
employees on private school premises creates a symbolic union between
church and state; and (iii) any and all public aid that directly aids the
educational function of religious schools impermissibly finances religious
indoctrination, even if the aid reaches such schools as a consequence of
private decisionmaking.
Since Aguilar and Ball, the Court has had several opportunities to
revisit the issue of whether placement of government officials or giving of
aid to sectarian schools was presumptively a government inculcation of
religious belief. In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 362 the

357.
358
359.
360.
361.
362.

!d. at 389.
!d. at 385.
!d. at 393 (internal quotation marks omitted).
!d. at 409.
!d.
509 U.S I (1993)
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Court expressly disavowed the notion that "the Establishment Clause [laid]
down [an] absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a sectarian
school." 363 "Such a flat rule, smacking of antiquated notions of 'taint,'
would indeed exalt form over substance." 364 Instead, the Court assumed
that the interpreter would dutifully discharge her responsibilities as a full
time public employee and comply with the ethical guidelines of her
profession by accurately translating what was said. 365 Because the only
government aid in Zobrest was the interpreter, who was herself not
inculcating any religious messages, no government indoctrination took
place and the Court was able to conclude that "the provision of such
assistance [was] not barred by the Establishment Clause." 366
In Agostini, the Court also acknowledged that it had departed from the
idea found in Ball that all governmental aid that directly assists the
educational function of religious schools is invalid. Thus, Agostini
acknowledges that it is no longer, as a matter of law, presumed that
governmental aid results in a "symbolic union" of church and state.
The Court also looked at whether such aid would result in excessive
entanglement. The Court found that not all entanglements have the effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion. The Court states, "[i]nteraction
between church and state is inevitable, ... and we have always tolerated
some level of involvement between the two. Entanglement must be
'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause." 367
The Court concluded by holding: I) "that a federally funded program
providing supplemental, remedial instruction to disadvantaged children on
a neutral basis is not invalid under the Establishment Clause when such
instruction is given on the premises of sectarian schools by government
employees pursuant to a program containing safeguards such as those
present here;" and 2) "that a carefully constrained program also cannot
reasonably be viewed as an endorsement of religion. " 368
e.

Alternatives to the Lemon tripart test

In recent years the Court has used two major alternative tests to that of
Lemon, the endorsement test and the coercion test. Neither test has yet
received much support from the entire Court ss serious permanent
alternatives to the Lemon tests.

363.
364.
365
366.
367.
368.

!d. at 13.
ld.
!d. at 12
!d.
Agostini. 117 S.Ct at 2015. See, e.g .. Bowan. 487 U.S. at 615-17.
!d. at 2016.
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Endorsement test

The chief proponent of this test is Justice O'Conner. 369 Justice
O'Conner argues for the abandonment of the entanglement prong as an
element for separate analysis. 370 She reasons that the "anomalous
results" 371 in many of the Court's analyses of Establishment Clause claims
were due to the "establishment prong" of the tri-part test. 372 Thus in
Wallace v. Jaffree, m Justice O'Conner argues that "direct government
action endorsing religion or particular religious practice is invalid under
this approach because it 'sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community.' " 374 She argues that "endorsement is
useful" because of the "analytical content" it gives to the Lemon-mandated
inquiry. 375 Justice O'Conner views this as a type of preference test since "it
does not preclude government from acknowledging religion or from taking
religion into account in making law and policy," 376 however, it does
"preclude government from conveying or attempting to convey a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred." 377
This view has met with considerable acceptance, particularly among
those who wish to maintain the Lemon test. 378 However, it has also faced
its share of criticism. One critic is Justice Kennedy who, in his dissenting
opm10n in Allegheny v. ACLU, 379 cntiCizes Justice O'Conner's
endorsement test as one that requires an inquiry "into the feelings of the

369. See Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (!989) (O'Conner, J., concurrin);); Aguilar v
Felton, 473 US. 402, 422-30 (1985) (O'Conner, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S 668,
691-692 (19841 (O'Conner, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (O'Conner, J,
concurring in judgment); see also Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Tmlilrds
Religion Under the Establishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Conner's hw);ht.
64 N.CL. REV. 1049, 1050-1052 (1986).
370. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. at 422-30 (O'Conner, J., dissenting).
371. See Alexandra Petrich, Bowen v. Kendrick: Retreat From Prophylaxis in Church-Swte
Relationships, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 513, 521 (1989):
For example, we permit a State to pay for bus transportation to a parochial school,
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 US. I (1947), but preclude states from providing
buses for parochial school field trips, on the theory that such trips involve excessi vc state
supervision of the parochial officials who lead them. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977).
!d. at n.62.
372. !d. at 521 n.63 ( 1989)
373. 472 US. 38.
374. !d.
375. !d.
376. !d.
377. !d.
378. See Loewy, sttpra note 369; Note, S/wrpenin); the Pron!is of the Establtshment Clause:
Applying Stricter Scrutiny to Majority Religions, 23 GA. L.REY. 1085 ( 1989)
379. 492 U.S 573, 654 < 1989)
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objective observer" without any meaningful guidance on resolution of that
inquiry. 380 Justice Kennedy's point lies in his perception of the inherent
ambiguities in Justice O'Conner's approach.
2.

Coercion tesf 81

One of the first cases to use a coercion analysis in relation to the
establishment clause was Engel. 382 The Supreme Court found that a public
school prayer ("Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country") said aloud each day in each classroom with a teacher present,
violated the Establishment Clause. 383 Although the Court was clear to
state, "[W]hile proof of coercion might provide a basis for a claim under
the Free Exercise Clause, it [is] not a necessary element of any claim under
the Establishment Clause") 384 The Court went on to find that "when the
power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion IS
plain. " 385
This analysis was incorporated into a component of the Lemon v.
Kurtzman test in the fragmented Allegheny v. ACLU, opinion. 386 In
Allegheny, Allegheny County had permitted (since 1981) a Roman
Catholic group to display a creche in the county courthouse. Eventually,
the creche was displayed in a separate area of the courthouse (on a
staircase) near a "gallery forum" (with other cultural displays) but far
enough away to be distinguished from the forum. The case also involved a
challenge to the display of a Menorah in front of the City-County building.
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, rejects the interpretation of the
Lemon prong (primary or principle effect of the government practice
should neither advance nor inhibit religion) that would include any direct
or symbolic advancement. He states that "absent coercion, the risk of
infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic accommodation is
minimal. Our cases reflect this reality by requiring a showing that the
symbolic recognition or accommodation advances religion to such a degree

380. !d. See also Hirt. "Symboltc Union" of Church and State and The "Endorsement" of
Sectanclll Activity: A Critique of Unwieldy Tools of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 24 W FOR.
LR. 823 (!989)
381. Rodriguez, God is Dead: Killed by Fifty Years of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,
23 SAINT MARY'S LJ. 1155, 1171-1184 (1992).
382. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 ( 1962).
383. /d. at 430 (1962)
384. !d.
385. /d. at 431
386. Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (!989).
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that it actually "establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so." 387 He goes on to state how coercion may be evident:
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in any religion or its
exercise; and it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or
callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a
degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious
faith, or tends to do so." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S., at 678. These
two principles, while distinct, are not unrelated, for it would be
difficult indeed to establish a religion without some measure of
more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form of taxation to supply
the substantial benefits that would sustain [492 U.S. 573, 660] a
state-established faith, direct compulsion to observance, or
governmental exhortation to religiosity that amounts in fact to
proselytizing. 388
In Lee v. Weisman, 389 public school officials in middle and high
schools in providence would routinely invite members of the clergy to give
invocations and benedictions at their school's graduation ceremonies.
Justice Kennedy wrote, "the principle that government may accommodate
the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations
imposed by the Establishment Clause."39°Kennedy found that the school's
action violated the second prong of the Lemon test by coercing students,
who "are often susceptible to pressure from their peers towards
conformity, and that the influence is strongest in matters of social
convention." 391 Kennedy goes on to explain how this is distinguished from
Marsh where the Court did not find a violation of the establishment clause.
Kennedy states,
But there are also obvious differences. The atmosphere at the
opening of a session of a state legislature, where adults are
free to enter and leave with little comment and for any
number of reasons, cannot compare with the constraining
potential of the one school event most important for the
student to attend. The influence and force of a formal exercise
in a school graduation are far greater than the prayer exercise
we condoned in Marsh. The Marsh majority in fact gave

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.
!d. at 662.
505 U.S. 577 (1992)
!d. at 587.
!d. at 593.
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specific recognition to this distinction, and placed particular
reliance on it in upholding the prayers at issue there. 392

f

Summary: separation to accommodation

From the foregoing, one can see two distinct directions the Court has
taken in Establishment Clause analysis. The first, represented by the
general strict separationist sentiments of Everson, 393 tends to utilize a
tripart test as an instrument that roots out any vestige of separation. The
second, represented by Zorach 394 and cases following it, especially
Agostini, 395 presents an accommodationist view of history that allows nonpreferential aid to religions.

3.

In search of a new model for Establishment Clause claims

Strict separation is an unworkable, if not unconstitutional, model.
Articulated in Everson, 396 but arguably not followed,397 it posits a view of
the church and state which is out of accord with the intention of the
Framers, 398 sets forth a misguided, if not contrived, presentation of the
historical information on which it relies, 399 and is contrary to the
relationship between organized religion and the state for most of
America's history. 400 Everson could not apply the strict separation model it
engendered because of the generally understood meaning of the First
Amendment that preceded Everson. It floundered in trying to separate
religion itself from generally applicable and non-preferential government
assistance to school children without distinction. This may be a significant
contributing factor that brought the inconsistency in Everson. Moreover,
the comments of Justice Black are addressed to the institutional church or

392 463 U S. 792.
393. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. I (1947).
394. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 ( 1952).
395. 521 U S. 203.
396. 330 U.S. I (1947)
397 330 U.S. at 18 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissentin~;):
[The] Court's opinion marshals every argument in favor of state aid and puts the
case in its most favorable light, but much of its reasoning confirms my
conclusions that there are no good grounds upon which to support the present
legislation. In fact, the undertones of the opinion, advocating complete and
uncompromising separation of Church from State, seem utterly discordant with its
conclusion yielding support to their commingling in educational matters.
398. See supra text accompanying footnotes 58-179.
399. See comment by LEVY, supra note 286.
400. See supra text accompanying footnotes 58-179.
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its sub-groups such as schools, not to individual religious practices of
citizens. Subsequent Court decisions attacked individual religious
practices apart from the matter of the institution of the church and the
institution of the state.
Recent Court decisions have begun to unravel these strict separationist
perspectives enacted through the artificial Lemon tests, instead favoring
more of an accommodationist view. The Lemon tests are still referred to in
an erratic way, but Lemon and strict separation appear to be gone for the
immediate future. As one author has noted, the decision in Bowen v.
Kendrick401 has sufficiently eroded the Lemon test so that there is a need
for a new "intellectually defensible" standard. 402 Subsequent cases have
even done more so. It is this need that has created in the past number of
years suggestions for re-tooling the tripart test or re-inventing another test
altogether and has caused Courts and legal scholars seek to find a new vie
of the Establishment Clause which does not yield such divergent and
contradictory decisions. 403
The purpose of this section is not to catalogue every attempt to grapple
with a new model for Establishment Clause jurisdiction; rather, its purpose
is to present certain representative approaches to understanding the
Establishment Clause or models that are oriented around fairly clear
interpretations of the Establishment Clause. Each of these models is an
attempt to allow the Establishment Clause to be more "friendly" toward
religion. Once a commitment has been made to a particular understanding
of what the clause "means," one then can analyze the appropriate
significance of this meaning. 404

a.

State constitutions

Some authors, disturbed with the "trend" in Establishment Clause
adjudication on the federal level, have urged litigants to go to their state
constitutions since they provide stricter, more explicit prohibitions on the
relationship between the state and religion. 405 Although this does not solve

40 I
402.
403.

487 U S. 589.
See Petrich. supra note 371
An emerging alternative theory, not discussed in this article, to that of strict separatiomsrn
and accomodationism, is the neutrality theory. See ESBECK, supra, note 44; see also Carl H. Esbcck.
The Establishment Clause: an Individual Rights Guarantee Or a Structural Clause Limiting
Governmental Power~. 84 IOWA LREV. I (1998).
404. Arnan and House, supra note 192.
405. See Note, Rebuilding the Wall Between Church and State: Public Sponsorship of
Religious Displays Under the Federal and CalifiJmia Constitutions, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 499 (1986);
and Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the
Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST LQ 451 (1988)
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the Federal Establishment Clause issue, it does, perhaps, provide a
"stricter" forum for the decision of Establishment Clause issues in general.
b.

Deconstruction and moral theory

I have placed these rather divergent theories together since, though
they posit different models, they both require a non-interpretivist approach
to the Establishment Clause.
The theory of deconstruction of a text is not new; it has been applied
in the area of literary theory for quite some time. 406 Deconstructionism
essentially views text as a "scene of repressed conflict" 407 that the reader
inevitably joins as the text is read. Such a theory is based on a type of
Hegelian understanding whereby the text presents both thesis and
antithesis; and the reader may or may not provide a synthesis. It is this
synthesis, obtained internally by the reader, which becomes the meaning of
the text. Thus, it is not difficult to conceive how nine Supreme Court
Justices may develop nine syntheses of the text. It is also not difficult to
see the inherent problems with such an approach. The essential task
accomplished by the reading involves how "it may enlarge our thoughts
about what a constitution is and how one can live in it." 408 Although
"readings that develop this perspective [a deconstructionist one] should not
lead to the demolition and dismissal of the Constitution,"409 this is the very
thing that happens. Once the text is couched in internally conflicting terms,
the text "unwinds" under any "objective" attempt to analyze it.
Another non-interpretivist model advocated is the "political-moral
reasoning model" of Establishment Clause adjudication. 410 This approach
may either find the non-interpretivist position unconvincing411 or as
defensible, yet not preferable, to the non-interpretivist. 412 The theory is
founded on the idea of "moral evolution" or "belief in moral progress." 413
In applying this to the Establishment Clause, one author has commented,
"None of these relatively nonactivist theories, however, adequately
explains the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine. This
doctrine requires instead a nonoriginalist theory of political-moral
reasoning, a theory that permits the Court simply to identify and apply

406.

See

JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (B. Johnson trans,

GRAMMATOLOGY (G. Spivak trans

407.
408.
409.
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1976); and BARBARA
233, at 182.

1981);

OF
(1980)

JACQUES DERRIDA,
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Leubsdorf, supra note
!d. at 181.
!d.
See Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory o{the c'stablishment Clause, 82 NW.
U.L REV. 1113 (1988).
411. See DWORKIN, supra note 233.
412. See MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
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principles and policies that are sound."414 He goes on to state that "judicial
activism of the sort defended here may be indefensible in other areas of
constitutional law. In this particular setting, however, the court's activism
is not merely justified, it is essential to the political and moral health of our
society."415
Critics of this theory have laid the ax, so to speak, at its roots by
challenging the concept of "moral evolution." The term is not selfdefining. Rather, it raises all sorts of questions about what type of "moral"
goals should we be working towards. As one commentator noted, "the
question of 'moral evolution' like that of 'social progress' is ultimately a
political question. To disjoin moral evolution and political philosophy ...
is necessmily unsatisfactory. Put differently, any adequate defense of
'human rights' must be, ultimately, a political defense, a defense of a
particular kind of society."416 Thus, the political-moral theory is one,
ultimately, of good intentions but without objective direction.
c.

Institutional separation

This model proposes the "eighteenth century" view of the
Establishment Clause as one that recognizes an institutional separation of
church and state be adopted over the "twentieth century" view that
interprets the "disestablishment" clause as a commitment to secular
government and policies. 417 The "original" commitment to institutional
separation is seen as having two purposes: 418 first, to protect the state from
"control or corruption" by the church, 419 and second, to protect the church
from "control or corruption" by the state. 420 Thus, the "essential task" of
the Establishment Clause would be both to prevent government from
interfering "with the internal affairs of religious institutions and,
conversely, to prohibit religious institutions from directly exercising
governmental authority."421 Under this approach, essential questions would
involve the institutional interactions between government and religion.
Some critics of this model have pointed out that it would significantly
cut back the role of the judiciary in Establishment Clause questions. 422 If
the alternative to institutional separation, integration of church and state, is

414.
415.
416.
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418.
419.
420.
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Conkle, supra note 410, at 1193.
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/d. at 1016.
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See Gerard v_ Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Reli!iious
Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. LREV. 674, at 679 (1987).
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no longer a possibility, the adoption of a separation construction would
seemingly render the Establishment Clause superfluous. 423 However, the
model does coincide with the historical or interpretivist view. 424
Additionally, the test would solve the "conflict" between the current
establishment and free exercise clause analysis. 425 Additionally, it is argued
that this model would permit an accommodationist approach as the
purpose for free exercise exemptions. The concept of establishment as any
government involvement with religion would be done away with and in its
stead, a concept of institutional separation would permit certain types of
interaction. 426

d.

Class action and Equal Protection models

In a student note, 427 the author responds to recent arguments that have
been made about the complementary nature of the two "clauses" in the
First Amendment. 428 He notes that although this view coincides with the
text and history of the First Amendment, it raises the question of whether it
is improper to "collapse them into each other." 429 It is from this concern
that he suggests a new approach. The Establishment Clause, functionally,
is a "public Jaw" analogue of the Free Exercise Clause. 430 Traditionally,
free exercise claims have been framed as requiring a compelling state
interest to justify the "coercion" of an individual's religious exercise. 431
The protection from being required to act contrary to one's religious
convictions is the "heart of the religious liberty guaranteed by the First
Amendment." 432 This element of coercion has also been identified in cases
involving one entity that receives a "public benefit" while another,
similarly situated, does not. 433 This disparity in treatment can also be
viewed as government "endorsement."434
Although the concept of group litigation or class action was not
present at the framing of the constitution, it might provide a realistic and
uniform approach to protect the types of interests, injury to individual
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religious liberties, which the Establishment Clause allegedly protects
against. 435 This view would allegedly clear up the standing and remedial
problems currently associated with Establishment and Free Exercise
Claims. 436
Potential problems with this approach might arise in the court's
application of class action concepts to First Amendment claims. The First
Amendment protects what has been traditionally viewed as an individual
right. Although the Establishment Clause may arguably not do so, the Free
Exercise Clause does. Converting Establishment Clause analysis into a
class action claim may minimize the free exercise claim underlying it.
Another approach that has been argued is an equal protection model
utilized for both establishment and free exercise claims. 437 This approach
would seek to use a strict scrutiny/compelling state interest approach in
cases that involve a free exercise claim or burden. 438 The Establishment
Clause is viewed as protecting religious libertl 39 and the free exercise
clause as defining the freedom of religious liberty-religious exercise. 440
Thus, the free exercise clause "defines the important individual liberty
while the Establishment Clause addresses the limits of allowable state
classifications affecting this liberty." 441 The equal protection analysis
would accomplish the same effect by viewing any religious hias
classification as "suspect," requiring a strict scrutiny analysis. 442
Although this model has a high view of the history and text of the First
Amendment, it is based on a test that is potentially ambiguous. The strict
scrutiny/compelling state interest analysis lacks the same "objective" frame
of reference as the above-described "endorsement" test. 443
e.

Nonpreferentialism

This is the view widely accepted prior to the Everson decision and
enjoys considerable historical evidence of its practice in the founding
period and thereafter. 444 Yet this is a specific view singled out by the
Everson court when it said that the Establishment Clause at least means
this: "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can . . . aid all

435. !d.
436. /d. at 1754. 1756.
437. Paulsen, supra note 193.
438. /d. at 313.
439. /d.
440. /d.
441 /d.
442. !d. at 324.
443. See text accompanying notes 369-80.
444. See generally, DREISBACH, supra note 184.

A TALE OF TWO KINGDOMS

203]

285

religions." 445 This addition serves as a major reason why the court has had
confusing holdings for more than fifty years.
In contrast to the separationist model, nonpreferentialism reflects the
sense of the freedom of religion envisioned by the Founders of the
Constitution. They wanted to minimize the tension among competing
religious groups (though not obliterating the Christian worldview that
underpinned the government and law) and to broadened the exercise of
personal and corporate religious freedom. The evidence is plain 446 that this
was their design and they were largely consistent with this intent:
Probably, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution,
and of the amendment to it, now under consideration, the
general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, that
Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the State, so
far as such encouragement was not incompatible with the
private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious
worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a
matter of state policy to hold all in utter indifference, would
have created universal disapprobation, if not universal
indignation. 447

The pluralistic attitude of the Framers, however, does not mean that
they would view Christianity alongside of other religions as being equal.
Joseph Story sets forth his view of the sentiment of these Framers that may
have preferred Christianity to other religions:
The real object of the First Amendment was not to
countenance, much less to advance, Mahometanism, or
Judaism, or infidelity, by prostrating Christianity; but to
exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and to prevent any
national ecclesiastical establishment which should give to a
hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national government.
It thus cuts off the means of religious persecution (the vice and
pest of former ages), and of the subversion of the rights of
conscience in matters of religion which had been trampled
upon almost from the days of the Apostles to the present
age.448
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In the eighteenth century there were no true rivals to Christianity in the
public or private spheres and so the concern for parity was of little
concern. Today various religious groups grace the religious completion of
America but the principle of equity among religions envisioned by the
Framers holds similar viability. When the government allows freedom for
all religions and equally permits participation in the opportunities offered
to all citizens, it serves rightly the intent of the First Amendment.

f

Suggestions for developing an operative model

The proposal for a new model to Establishment Clause adjudication is
not without potential problems, as seen above. Furthermore, the Court's
retreat from granting religious exercise claims that conflict with any
government interest, compelling or not, seems to be quickening at an
alarming rate. 449 This has been attributed to the "conservative" majoritJ 50
that now exists on the Supreme Court. Yet, whatever the reason, it seems
apparent that the Lemon test will undergo further mutation. Furthermore,
the narrow distinctions made between supplying parochial school with
books but not maps, 451 has been ridiculed for the seemingly absurd lines
that the Supreme Court has drawn in the name of Lemon. 452
In formulating a new model, I believe those based on a non-originalist
view 453 and those which rely on a non-objective model are doomed to
continue a clash between the Religion Clauses. A model that gives due
consideration to the historical evolution of American law within a JudeaChristian framework and yet allows for the pluralistic development of
religions requires a non-preferential and institutional separation

449. See, L.A. nMES April 18, 1990. sec. I col. 3. The article discusses Employment Division
v. Smith, written by Justice Scalia, which criticizes past accommodation of individual religious
exercise over government interest. The case involved a Native American Indian's use of peyote in
religious exercises Justice Scalia argued that a compelling interest no longer needed to be asserted
although he did suggest that if an individual's religious freedom is to be protected. Congress could
provide such protection through legislation.
450. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia. Justice O'Conner and Justice
Kennedy.
451. Compare Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, at 252-255 (1977) (invalidating a loan to
parochial schools of materials such as maps and globes because these materials would be used in
an integrated and religious education) with Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968)
(sustaining a loan of books to parochial schools because there was no indication that the books would
be used to teach religion). See also Smith, supra note 31, at I 022.
452. See Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Reli~:ious Doctrine.
72 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 352 (1986)
453. See text accompanying notes 233-36.
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approach. 454 Thus, I would prefer to endorse the institutional separation
view. This view seems to be the most objective in its application. 455 In
cases that deal with state aid programs, the question asked by the Court
would shift from whether tile program, in some way, "advances religion"
to whether the program directly and impermissibly involves the state in the
internal affairs of a religious institution. 456 The separation construction
would not require the courts to determine whether the form of aid is purely
or inherently secular. State aid that might have the "effect" of assisting
religion would not, of itself, require invalidation of the law. 457
Additionally, it would reduce the number of conflicts between the
Establishment Clause and other Constitutional provisions such as free
exercise and free speech clauses. 458 For example, in exempting religious
believers from military service or compulsory secondary education,
government would not have to interfere with the doctrine or ecclesiastical
structure of religious institutions. However, under the secularism
requirement, this type of accommodation would be impermissible since it
both serves a religious purpose and it has the effect of advancing religion
by facilitating the practice of religious convictions. 459 In situations like this
the Court would only need to look to religious liberty or free exercise
concerns, not establishment.
The institutional separation model may help in keeping the state out of
the institution of the church but what about activities such as prayer at
public gatherings that are not strictly "church" activities. In situations like
this, the direct coercion standard advocated in the dissent by Justice Scalia
in Lee v. Weisman may prove helpful. In this matter, only what directly
interferes with religious liberty becomes an establishment of religion. No
one can be pressured or forced by the government to practice a religious
exercise or adopt religious beliefs. Such coercion would not be interpreted
as being respectful and quiet as someone is allowed to practice their own
belief. Ralph Johnson correctly points out that in Lee v. Weisman, the

Weismans were not coerced by force oflaw or threat of penalty
to join in the graduation prayers. Indeed, they never
complained of any coercion to participate. Rather, Mr.

454. See Smith, supra note 31.
455. ld at 1021.
456. !d.
457. !d. Although it would not prevent the government from advancing religion in certain ways
(see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)), it would
prevent government from establishing an official state church or conferring governmental powers
upon churches (see Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), a statute pennitting churches
to veto applications for liquor licenses when the establishment applying for said license is within
500-foot radius of the church was held unconstitutional).
458. See Smith, supra note 31, at I 026.
459. !d.
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Weisman was "opposed to and offended by the inclusion of the
prayer." However, under the direct coercion test, this can not
be the basis of an Establishment Clause violation. 460

Although the Establishment Clause began its "career" in the concept
of separation of church and state, 461 the phrase came to mean, in the
twentieth century, political and governmental secularism. 462 In an attempt
to recapture the true meaning of the Establishment Clause, one can find a
test and approach to Religion Clause jurisprudence, I believe, that is both
workable and consistent with the proper interpretation of the First
Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION

Providing for institutional separation of church and state but not
intruding into voluntary religious expression of individuals is the ideal
manner for religion and government to function in our pluralistic society.
The continuing clash between religion and the state is due to the attempt to
separate us from our past, a past that cannot be eradicated from our law
and government without doing irreparable harm to our form of
government. The rise of non-Christian religions provides a challenge, but
not one insurmountable. Allowing all religious perspectives access to the
public forums of America is both legally correct and religiously satisfying.
It is impossible (and perhaps undesirable) to aspire to a completely secular
state that is devoid of any public religious expression. Religion, for good
or ill, has been the foundation of Western law and provided the very model
for legitimate "separation" and it remains one of the primary motivations
for human action. It serves at the "lynchpin" for fundamental freedoms
such as liberty and equality. The strict separationist model, as found in the
majority of the cases from Everson through Lemon, and still occasionally
haunts the Court's decisions, needs to be forever abandoned and a model
which keeps the state out of the activities of organized religion, but not
religion from the public sector, needs to be warmly embraced by the Court.
When the state provides for the general public, religion may have
nonpreferential access to the benefits of government without there being
an establishment, as long as government does not try to dictate to the

460. Johnson. Lee v. Weisman: Easy Cases Make Bad Law Too-The Direct Coercion Test
is the Appropriate Establishment Clause Standard, 2 GEO. MADISON [NDENDENT L REV. 123, 192
(1993)
461. In using this phrase, I am speaking of the historical concept of separation which would
be that of the institutions of Church and State. See CORD, supra note 17.
462. See Smith, supra note 31, at 975-979.
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religious entity. When groups or individuals have a public forum, they
should be on the same footing with non-religious groups and individuals
and toleration should be expressed toward all. The key is that there be no
force of the government to require one to practice religious ritual or
devotion nor adopt religious beliefs that are specifically sectarian in nature;
this is the vision of the Framers based on the Reformation foundation.
The kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world are not
incompatible when we move toward such a model that I have suggested.
Many details need to be worked out, but the state and religion can
peacefully exist without either losing its proper function in America.
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APPENDIX

The following graphs reveal the level at which the Bible and
Blackstone were heavily relied on during the period of 1760-1805: 463

DISTRIBUTION OF CITATIONS BY DECADE

Bible
Enlight'ment
Whig
Common Law

Classical
Peers
Others

1760s 1770s 1780s 1790s 1800-05
24
44
34
29
38
21
18
24
18
32
19
20
17
10
15
12
4
9
14
20
11
10
11
2
8
6
2
3
5
6
I
I
8
2
2

Total%
34
22
18
ll
9
4
2

CITATIONS OF THINKERS IN EARLY AMERICA BY DECADE(%)

Montesquieu
Blackstone
Locke
Hwne
Plutarch
Pufendorf
Coke
Hobbes
Others

46.1

1760s
8
1
ll
1
1
4
5
0
69

1770s
7
3
7
1
3
0
0
I
78

1780s 1790s
14
4
7
11
I
I
1
6
1
2
1
0
1
2
1
0
73
74

1800-05
I

15
1
5
4
5
4
0
65

Total%
8.3
7.9
2.9
2.7
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.0
73.3

Hyncman. Sllf'm note II 8 Sec these charts in EIDSMOE, supra note 136, at 52- 53; and

Lutz, sUJ'm note I 04, at l X9 - !97.
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Montesquieu
Blackstone

8.3%
7.9%

Locke
Hume
Plutarch
Coke
Cicero
Hobbes
Rousseau
Bacon
Shakespeare
Plato
Machiavelli
Voltaire

2.9%
2.7%
1.5%
1.3%
1.2%
1.0%
.9%
.8%
.8%
.5%
.5%
.5%

1760-1805 (%)

The most quoted source, including books and authors, during the
Constitutional Period, 1780s-1790s was the Old Testament book of
Deuteronomy, the Covenant Book.

